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1In the wake of the September 11, 2001,
tragedies and the subsequent anthrax attacks,
the nation has recognized the need to improve
its bioterrorism response capabilities.  At the
same time, traditional public health functions
have continued to demand attention.  These
range from responding to infectious disease
outbreaks like West Nile virus and the flu to
ongoing diseases like asthma and diabetes to
managing the health aftermaths of natural dis-
asters such as hurricanes and tornadoes.  
The need for greater public health capacity
post-9/11 strained a system that was already
“structurally weak in nearly every area.”1 After
the 2001 tragedies, the U.S. Congress sought to
strengthen the system by investing an unprece-
dented amount in bioterrorism preparedness
and the public health infrastructure.  
This report examines -- three years later -- the
progress that has been made in the nation’s
ability to respond to public health emergencies,
and the vulnerabilities that remain.2
In December 2003, Trust for America’s
Health (TFAH) issued its first study of the
nation’s response to the bioterrorist threat.
Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s
Health in the Age of Bioterrorism found
that two years after 9/11, states had taken
action to protect their citizens but were only
modestly better prepared to respond to
health threats than they were before the
2001 tragedies.
The 2004 edition of Ready or Not? finds that
one year later, states across the country are
still struggling to meet basic preparedness
requirements and have inadequate resources
to juggle the competing health priorities they
face. 
The unprecedented federal investment in
bioterrorism preparedness has resulted in
important progress in several key areas,
most notably in emergency communications
and laboratories.  However, several areas of
serious vulnerability remain.  Limited
Introduction
The public health system is responsible for the prevention and reduc-tion of disease and injury in the U.S.  This includes working to protect
the health of communities from natural and manmade threats.  
During a biological, chemical, or radiological attack, public health profes-
sionals act as first responders, investigators, strategists, and medical care
providers, making key decisions about how to diagnose and contain the
spread of disease and treat individuals who were injured or may have been
exposed to infectious or harmful materials.
 America’s public health system is not a single entity, but rather a loosely affiliated network of
approximately 3,000 federal, state, and local health agencies.
 State governments have primary responsibility for the health of their citizens under U.S. law.
WHAT IS PUBLIC HEALTH? -- THE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION OF
DISEASE AND INJURY.
2resources, workforce shortages, and the lack
of a comprehensive information network
continue to hinder progress.  Additionally, a
lack of consensus and communication
between local, state, and federal efforts and
the absence of standardized national per-
formance accountability measures threaten
to imperil future readiness initiatives.  
This report is intended to serve as a tool to
help the nation move toward an improved,
strategic, modern “all-hazards” public health
system, as most of the same resources and
capabilities necessary to respond to acci-
dents or threats posed by nature are needed
to respond to terrorist threats.  Bioterrorism
preparedness cannot be viewed as an isolat-
ed problem that can be prepared for alone.
Only when the public health system is capa-
ble of responding to all threats will it be pre-
pared to respond to any single threat.
Three years after 9/11, many basic bioter-
rorism detection, diagnosis, and response
capabilities are not in place.  While progress
has been made, there is a still a very long
way to go to reach adequate preparedness.
States have been left to manage shifting and
competing priorities, without enough sup-
port to focus on fixing the fundamental,
tried-and-true basics that are the backbone
of a well-functioning public health system.
Bioterrorism preparedness still lacks strategic
direction, well-defined priorities, and appro-
priate levels of resources to match the needs.
A review of the remaining gaps that exist,
three years after improvement efforts began,
begs the conclusion that bioterrorism and
public health preparedness have not been
treated as serious, top national priorities.
PUBLIC HEALTH POST-9/11
Progress and Concerns from 2003 to 2004
PROGRESS
 Clear demonstration that federal bioterrorism funds are having a positive impact
 Initial plans and several critical benchmarks achieved
 Emergency communications systems improved
 Dramatic upgrades in public health laboratory capabilities
 Bolstered natural and accidental public health emergency response preparedness 
 Improved flu vaccination and pandemic planning 
CONCERNS
 Shifting federal priorities and programs are distracting from fixing fundamentals
 Insufficient accountability and coordination at the federal, state, and local levels
 Unprepared for vaccine and antidote stockpile distribution and administration
 Stalled upgrades for disease tracking and warning systems 
 Impending severe workforce crisis impairing preparedness efforts
 Chemical terrorism preparedness is lagging
 Radiological and nuclear terrorism preparedness have not been adequately addressed
 Lack of adequate funds for many basic improvements
3KEY 2004 FINDINGS
 Nearly one-third of states cut their public health budgets in FY 2003-2004 and federal bioter-
rorism funding decreased by over $1 million per state in 2004, while states still do not have
adequate resources to address their preparedness gaps.
 Only six states have achieved “green” status for the Strategic National Stockpile, which
means being recognized as adequately prepared to administer and distribute vaccines and
antidotes in the event of an emergency.
 Only five public health labs report capabilities (facilities, technology and/or equipment,) 
to adequately respond to a chemical terrorism threat, and only one-third of states report 
that they have sufficient bioterrorism lab response capabilities (facilities, technology and/or
equipment).   
 Nearly 60 percent of states report that they do not have adequate numbers of laboratory sci-
entists to manage tests for anthrax or the plague if there were to be a suspected outbreak.  
 Two-thirds of the states do not use national standards to track disease outbreak information
via the Internet, causing serious delays in reporting and rendering rapid or early warning of
disease threats difficult.
 Coordination between federal, state, and local health agencies is still strained, often due to
competition for limited resources.  
 The public health workforce is on the brink of an urgent “brain drain” as the baby boomers
retire and next generation recruitment efforts suffer.
 Concerns remain that states are unprepared to implement a quarantine, although every state
except Alaska has adequate statutory authority to quarantine in response to a hypothetical
bioterrorism attack.
 Although planning for a flu pandemic (often viewed as requiring a similar response to a bioter-
rorism attack) has improved, 20 states still do not have publicly available plans in place, and,
based on model estimates, an outbreak would still have dire consequences.
4“THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM 
RESPONSE ACT OF 2002”
In June 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the “Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Response Act of 2002,” which reauthorized or updated several grant programs established
under earlier legislation, including the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act and the
Public Health Service Act.   The legislation was passed in recognition of public health’s essen-
tial and expanded role in homeland security.  It also established a funding program for state
and local jurisdictions to help implement preparedness activities against bioterrorism and to
strengthen capabilities against water, agricultural, and foodborne terrorism.3
Some have criticized the implementation of the Act, citing the lack of a comprehensive prepared-
ness plan, the failure to appoint a directed leader of the Act’s implementation, the lack of accounta-
bility standards to measure progress, an absence of input from first-responders and on-the-ground
health personnel, and not enough resources provided to match the improvement needs.
The legislation expires at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2006.
FEDERAL FUNDING FOR STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES
VIA CDC BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS “COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS”
The federal funds for state bioterrorism preparedness are largely in the form of “cooperative
agreements” distributed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to states,
and funds distributed by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to hospitals.
This report examines the CDC “cooperative agreement” funds distributed for August 2003 to
August 2004, since public health departments have the primary responsibility for protecting the
health of communities.  
In May 2003, the CDC issued guidance to states on how to use their upcoming year’s cooper-
ative agreement funds.  (For a list of state-by-state funding amounts, see Appendix B,
“Bioterrorism Funding by Source and Year.”)  Areas of concentration in the guidance included: 
 Preparedness planning, including for the Strategic National Stockpile; 
 Surveillance and epidemiology; 
 Laboratory capacity for biological agents; 
 Laboratory capacity for chemical agents; 
 Information technology, including the Health Alert Network;
 Communications about health threats; and 
 Education and workforce training.4
The cooperative agreement funding was $940 million for FY 2002, $870 million for FY 2003, and $849
million for FY 2004.  Pre 9/11 funding for bioterrorism preparedness was $67 million in FY 2001.
5GAO REPORT ON STATES’ PREPAREDNESS
A February 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, HHS Bioterrorism
Preparedness Programs: States Reported Progress But Fell Short on Program Goals for 2002,
concluded that “states are more prepared now than they were prior to these [CDC and
HRSA cooperative agreement] programs, but much remains to be accomplished.”5
“Some of the 14 requirements that CDC considers critical benchmarks of preparedness were more
likely to be completed than others. Four critical benchmarks were met by most of the states.
These benchmarks included the establishment of a bioterrorism advisory committee and coverage
of 90 percent of the state’s population by the Health Alert Network-a nationwide program
designed to ensure communication capacity at all state and local health departments. Two critical
benchmarks were met by few of the states: development of a statewide response plan and develop-
ment of a regional response plan. The remaining eight critical benchmarks were met by around half
the states. These benchmarks included assessment of emergency preparedness and response capa-
bilities, development of a system that can receive and evaluate urgent disease reports at all times,
and development of an interim Strategic National Stockpile plan. In addition, state and local offi-
cials reported three main factors that hindered their ability to complete all of CDC’s requirements:
(1) redirection of resources to the National Smallpox Vaccination Program, (2) difficulties in
increasing personnel as a result of state and local budget deficits, and (3) delays caused by state
and local management practices, such as contracting and hiring procedures.”

7TFAH, with input from an advisory committee
including state and local officials, developed
10 key indicators to assess the states’ public
health emergency preparedness capabilities.
These indicators, taken collectively, offer a
composite snapshot of capabilities, including
areas of improvement and vulnerability.
TFAH’s indicators are divided into three
general categories, which are similar to the
2003 report:
A) Funding.
B) “Back to Public Health Basics.”
This includes the fundamental com-
ponents of a comprehensive public
health system, including workforce,
laboratories, health tracking, and
communications systems.
C) “All-Hazards.”  This reflects how
bioterrorism preparedness efforts
are impacting traditional public
health functions.  
The 2003 report also contained 10 indica-
tors.  Several of this report’s indicators differ
from the 2003 report to reflect changed
expectations for levels of preparedness one
year later.  Preparedness in 2004 should be
greater than in 2003, given the additional
time and funding that has been devoted
toward improvement efforts.  For instance,
in last year’s report, all states demonstrated
that they achieved completion of their initial
preparedness plans required to qualify for
CDC funds, so this indicator was removed
from this year’s evaluation. 
Each state received a score based on a scale of
the 10 indicators.  A state received one point
for achieving an indicator or zero points if it
did not achieve the indicator.  Zero was the
lowest possible score, and 10 was the highest.  
Public health is typically difficult to evaluate
due to a general dearth of available, accessi-
ble, accurate, and specific information
about public health systems and perform-
ance, such as a system’s ability to properly
track the use of taxpayer dollars or measure
disease rates in communities.  This informa-
tion should be considered essential for
maintaining an accountable, responsive,
and coordinated public health system.  
This report concentrated on 10 measurable
performance indicators from a variety of pub-
licly available sources.  The lack of other sets of
data to verify or enhance these indicators
demonstrates the need for additional account-
able and measurable information about the
performance of public health in America.  In
the few case where states failed to provide data
for a particular indicator, zero points were
given (which is noted in the tables).
STATE SCORES: 
TFAH Rates Public
Health Preparedness
Each state faces unique challenges and resource limitations in meetingpreparedness goals.  Understanding the difference in capabilities
among states is key to knowing how the states would be able to work togeth-
er in times of emergency and where to target improvement efforts.  Despite
differences among states, there are fundamental protections that all commu-
nities should expect from their public health systems.  
1C H A P T E R
89
Florida
North Carolina
8
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Virginia
7
Kansas
Kentucky
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
North Dakota
South Dakota
Vermont
6
Colorado
Connecticut
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
5
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Delaware
Illinois
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Rhode Island
4
D.C.
Indiana
Pennsylvania
Wyoming
3
Alaska
Massachusetts
Number of Indicators Color
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
WA
NV
AZ
CO
NE
ND
MN
WI
IL
KY VA
NY
HI
MD
DC
DE
NJ
NH
VT
MA
RI
CT
NC
LA
AR
MS AL
SD
KS MO
TN
GA
SC
FL
IN OH
WV
PA
ME
MI
IA
OK
TX
NM
OR
ID
MT
WY
UT
AK
CA
Two states received the highest score, Florida
and North Carolina, achieving nine out of
the possible 10 indicators.  Two states, Alaska
and Massachusetts, had the lowest scores with
three out of 10.  
Over two-thirds of states and D.C. achieved a
score of six or less.  Although the modified indi-
cators eliminate direct comparisons between
the 2003 and 2004 reports, in last year’s report,
nearly 95 percent (46 states and D.C.) received
a score of six or less.  In the 2004 report, 34
states and D.C. obtained higher scores, nine
states remained the same, and seven declined.
Overall, while the scores demonstrate contin-
ued incremental progress, preparedness is
still lagging behind goals and expectations.
With most states still in the middle range of
the scale and no states achieving the top pos-
sible score, there are still major areas of vul-
nerability that leave Americans at risk.
The scores demonstrate that bioterrorism
preparedness policy is ill-defined and incon-
sistent.  More than three-years after 9/11,
there is no clear definition for what the pub-
lic should expect as protection in the event
of bioterrorist attack or public health emer-
gency, and there are no real performance
standards in place to assess how well the
public would be protected in the event of
such tragedies.   
9Funding “Back to Basics” All-Hazards 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Spent or State spending Local Has less than Has Has enough Has a disease Has legal Increased flu Has pandemic 
obligated at on public concurrence 25% of public sufficient lab scientists tracking authority to vaccination flu plan
States least 90% of health with state’s health BSL-3 labs to test for system in day- quarantine rates in 
FY 2003 increased bioterror workforce anthrax to-day use adults 65 + 
federal funds or was preparedness eligible to or plague where infor- from ’02-’03
maintained plan retire within mation can be 2004
5 years monitored via Total / 
Internet Score
Alabama      5
Alaska    3
Arizona      5
Arkansas      5
California      5
Colorado       6
Connecticut       6
Delaware      5
District of Columbia     4
Florida          9
Georgia       6
Hawaii       6
Idaho       6
Illinois      5
Indiana     4
Iowa       6
Kansas        7
Kentucky        7
Louisiana       6
Maine       6
Maryland       6
Massachusetts    3
Michigan       6
Minnesota         8
Mississippi        7
Missouri        7
Montana        7
Nebraska         8
Nevada      5
New Hampshire         8
New Jersey      5
New Mexico      5
New York      5
North Carolina          9
North Dakota        7
Ohio       6
Oklahoma       6
Oregon       6
Pennsylvania     4
Rhode Island      5
South Carolina       6
South Dakota        7
Tennessee       6
Texas       6
Utah       6
Vermont        7
Virginia         8
Washington       6
West Virginia       6
Wisconsin       6
Wyoming     4
Total 29 35+D.C. 35+D.C. 28 16 21 18 48+DC 38+D.C. 30
STATE PREPAREDNESS SCORES
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Source: Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials (ASTHO), November 2004 survey.
* -- State did not spend or obligate at least 90 per-
cent of its FY 2002 according to last year’s survey.
Note: States have an additional 90 days after August
31, 2004 (the period of time this survey covered) to
submit final spending reports, therefore additional
states may have spent 90 percent or more of their
funds at the time of the release of this report.  D.C.
did not respond to ASTHO survey and since it did
not demonstrate use of funds, did not receive a
point for the indicator.
Despite continued federal dollars, nearly one-third of states cut their public health
budgets in FY 2003-2004, and states still do not have adequate resources to address
their preparedness gaps.
Indicator 1: State Spending of Federal Funds
A. FUNDING INDICATORS
29 states spent or obligated 90 percent
or more of their FY 2003 federal bioter-
ror preparedness funding (1 point)
Alaska (100%)
California (98%)
Florida (92%)
Hawaii* (96%)
Illinois (99%)
Indiana* (100%)
Iowa (97%)
Kansas (100%)
Maine (94%)
Maryland (100%)
Michigan (91%)
Minnesota* (98%)
Missouri (95%)
Nebraska (99%)
Nevada* (97%)
New Hampshire* (91%)
New York (98%)
North Carolina (98%)
North Dakota (95%)
Oklahoma (100%)
Oregon* (100%)
Rhode Island (100%)
South Carolina* (96%)
South Dakota (90%)
Utah (100%)
Vermont* (97%)
Virginia* (100%)
Washington (94%)
West Virginia* (94%)
21 states and D.C. did NOT spend or
obligate 90 percent or more of their FY
2003 federal bioterror preparedness
funding (0 points)
Alabama (82%)
Arizona* (84%)
Arkansas* (71%)
Colorado (87%)
Connecticut* (88%)
Delaware (83%)
Georgia* (78%)
Idaho* (89%)
Kentucky* (89%)
Louisiana (68%)
Massachusetts* (86%)
Mississippi* (75%)
Montana* (88%)
New Jersey* (80%)
New Mexico* (85%)
Ohio* (87%)
Pennsylvania* (65%)
Tennessee (84%)
Texas* (88%)
Wisconsin* (89%)
Wyoming* (85%)
FINDING: THE NUMBER OF STATES ABLE TO MAKE NEARLY-FULL USE OF 
FEDERAL BIOTERRORISM FUNDS INCREASED FROM LAST YEAR, AND LESS THAN 
10 PERCENT OF FY 2003 FEDERAL FUNDS ARE UNSPENT. 
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Based on a survey conducted by the
Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials (ASTHO) in November 2004, 29
states had spent or obligated (mostly
through contracts) 90 percent or more of
their FY 2003 federal bioterrorism funds.6
A third of all responding states indicated
that they have spent or obligated 98 percent
or more of their funds.  As a result, less than
10 percent of the FY 2003 federal bioterror-
ism funds for states went unspent.  
The 29 states with over 90 percent spending
represents an increase from 24 states reach-
ing the 90 percent level in the 2003 Ready or
Not? report.  One reason for the increase is
that FY 2002 was the first year that these
funds were made available to states, and dur-
ing this period many states focused on devel-
oping spending plans and assessing needs
before spending their funds.
Former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services Tommy Thompson expressed con-
cern earlier this year that states may not be
spending their federal funds in a timely or
effective manner, indicating that this may
reflect a lack of need for the funds.  In a let-
ter Thompson wrote to the chairs of the
Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education Appropriations Subcommittees of
the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S.
Senate, he said, “I have been very concerned
for over a year about the slow rate at which
States are expending available Federal funds
to improve homeland defense, and the large
unliquidated balances that remain from the
FY 2002 and FY 2003 grants.”7
The data from the ASTHO survey, however,
reveal that most states are spending the
majority of their federal funds.  Additionally,
a report released on August 5, 2004, by the
Office of the Inspector General of HHS
found a “variety of reasons” for some states’
inability to obligate portions of the funds:  
Awardee officials indicated that unobligated
program funds resulted from delays and diffi-
culties in the following areas:  recruiting and
hiring personnel, caused by staffing changes
and hiring freezes; coordinating the startup of
new activities, caused by an extensive needs
assessment process; executing contracts; issu-
ing Requests for Proposals and bids for pro-
curement; and purchasing lab equipment,
supplies, and other materials.  CDC also sub-
stantially increased funding from Program
Year 3 from $41 million to $982 million.8
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Source: Survey research by TFAH and Health
Policy Tracking Service (HPTS).
* -- State cut its public health budget in FY 2003.
(#) --  State spending analysis included health
care, such as Medicaid, and/or funding for
human services such as developmental disabilities.
(++) --  State with biennium budget. TFAH allo-
cated state’s percentage change in public health
spending over the biennium.
Note:  Budget numbers for Wyoming are for state
FY 2002 and 2003.
Indicator 2: State Public Health Budgets 2003-2004
35 states and D.C. increased or main-
tained level funding for public health
services from FY 2003 to 2004 (1 point)
15 states DECREASED funding for public
health services from FY 2003 to 2004 
(0 points)
State Percent Increase State Percent Decrease
Arkansas* 6% Alabama -14%
Arizona 9% Alaska* -15%
California 3% Connecticut* -6%
Colorado 13% Georgia* -2%
Delaware* 6% Idaho* -1%
D.C.* 3% Indiana -8%
Florida* (#) 4% Kansas* -3%
Hawaii 0.2% Maryland (#) -1%
Iowa* 4% Massachusetts* -3%
Illinois* 0.3% New Hampshire (#) -9%
Kentucky* 1% New Jersey -11%
Louisiana 13% New York (#) -10%
Maine* 1% Pennsylvania* -8%
Michigan* (#) 4% South Carolina* -0.4%
Minnesota* 3% Wyoming -0.4%
Mississippi* 3%
Missouri* (#) 4%
Montana*(++) 1%
Nebraska 2%
North Carolina* 23%
North Dakota* (++) 0.1%
Nevada 4.3%
New Mexico* 0.4%
Ohio 5%
Oklahoma* 3%
Oregon* (#) (++) 6%
Rhode Island 7%
South Dakota* 1%
Tennessee 0.2%
Texas (#) 8%
Utah* (#) 14%
Virginia* 0.2%
Vermont* 1%
Washington* 5%
West Virginia 3.5%
Wisconsin* 11%
FINDING: NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF STATES CUT THEIR PUBLIC HEALTH
BUDGETS IN FY 2003-2004, AND FEDERAL BIOTERRORISM FUNDING WAS CUT BY
OVER $1 MILLION PER STATE IN 2004.
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The analysis for this indicator is based on a
review of state public health budgets conducted
by the Health Policy Tracking Service (HPTS)
at Netscan iPublishing, Inc., formerly of the
National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL), in conjunction with TFAH from
August to November 2004.  Appropriations for
public health programs and for the agency,
department, or division in charge of public
health services were considered for state fiscal
years 2003 to 2004.9 States do not have a uni-
form definition of public health, so direct com-
parisons across states are unachievable.
In addition, although some states make pub-
lic health funding numbers available sepa-
rately, many do not.  Public health dollars are
often bundled with health care spending
such as Medicaid, or human services funding
such as disability services.  Other states report
total budgets that include federal funding
dollars.  This can lead to an overstatement of
public health funding in those states.  Several
states who received a point for this indicator
may not have actually increased their spend-
ing on public health programs.
Without separate reporting for public health,
there is limited understanding of funding levels
for these important programs.  The Institute of
Medicine (IOM) has recognized this problem
and noted in a 2003 report that no reporting
system for public health dollars exists and that
there is virtually no data available on state pub-
lic health expenditures and programs.  The
IOM urged the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to collect such infor-
mation at the state, local, and federal level.  In
the past HHS has worked with partner organi-
zations to create a reporting system, but to date,
no such system exists.  Without such a reporting
system, it is difficult to assess the ability of the
nation to provide critical public health services
to every community.10
Further, communities should be given infor-
mation to understand how their tax dollars
are being spent.  Such information would
allow them to better communicate their
public health funding priorities, interests,
and concerns with policymakers, and hold
them accountable.
Fifteen states cut their public health budgets
between FY 2003-2004.  The 2003 Ready or
Not? report found that 32 states and D.C.
had cut their budgets between FY 2002-
2003.  Eight states decreased their public
health funding in both budget cycles (FY
2002-2003 and FY 2003-2004).  
Additionally, all states received over a $1 mil-
lion decrease in their federal bioterrorism
funding in FY 2004 due to an HHS plan to
“reprogram” approximately $55 million desig-
nated to go to the “Cities Readiness Initiative”
and to support other federal programs, such
as the BioSense initiative. (The Cities
Readiness Initiative is discussed further in
Chapter Two: Federal Programs Overview).
After three years of severe budget problems
that began in FY 2001, state budgets are show-
ing signs of improvement in 2004, according
to a recent survey of states by the National
Governors Association and the National
Association of State Budget Officers.11 The
improving national economy has improved
state revenues through increased corporate
taxes and sales taxes.  This trend may help to
explain TFAH’s finding that fewer states cut
their public health budgets compared to last
year.  However, as the national and state finan-
cial situations improve, given the gaps in pub-
lic health programs and preparedness and
resultant vulnerabilities to the health of com-
munities, it is concerning that many states are
continuing to cut funds to these programs.
This analysis does not take inflation into
account, so smaller increases may actually be
level or even a decrease in real amounts. 
Adequate and stable funding are important
to providing essential public health services
to communities in addition to attempts to
make improvements.  Overall public health
funding falls far short of the levels needed
to support modernization efforts.
The Public Health Foundation estimates
that an infusion of an additional $10 billion
would be necessary to bring the public
health system in the U.S. up to an accept-
able level of preparedness.12
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ARE FEDERAL FUNDS SUPPLEMENTING OR SUPPLANTING STATE
FUNDS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH?  AN INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATES.
An August 5, 2004 audit report by the HHS Office of the Inspector General stated that,
“Bioterrorism program funds, both original and supplemental, were to be used to augment
current funding and focus on public health preparedness activities under the CDC
Cooperative Agreement.  The funds were not to be used to supplant existing Federal, State,
or local funds for bioterrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, other public health threats and
emergencies, and public health infrastructure within the jurisdiction.  [CDC] Program
Announcement 99051 states that ‘... cooperative agreement funds under this program may
not be used to replace or supplant any current state or local expenditures.’”13
“In response to our questionnaire and during our onsite interviews, officials from all 17 awardees
[included in the audit] asserted that Federal bioterrorism program funding had not supplanted
existing State and local bioterrorism programs....  We did not validate their assertions.”14 The
Inspector General is planning to do follow-up, in-depth reviews on this issue.
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An effective public health defense consists
of many components, including:
 Coordination among the key health part-
ners at the federal, state, and local levels;
 A trained and stable workforce, including
epidemiologists, public health nurses,
and frontline responders;
 Laboratories that can test and diagnose
outbreaks and investigate their causes; 
 Stockpiles of vaccines and antidotes, and
systems to administer them to the public;
 Communications and emergency alert
systems which provide information to the
public and health workers; and
 Health tracking systems to monitor the
health of communities, including rapid
detection of outbreaks or attacks.
TFAH examined six “Back-to-Basics” indica-
tors: state-local concurrence; workforce sta-
bility; laboratories’ bioterrorism capabili-
ties; lab workforce training and capacity; dis-
ease tracking/surveillance, and quarantine
authority.   TFAH found troubling short-
comings in most of these six indicators.
While there has been significant improvement in some public health basics, including
laboratory capacity, emergency communications, and planning, other fundamentals have
been neglected.
B: PUBLIC HEALTH “BACK TO BASICS” INDICATORS.
Pyramid of Public Health System Preparedness
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Public Health
Response
• Bioterrorism
• Emerging Infections
• Other Health Threats
Laboratory
Capacity
Epidemic
InvestigationSurveillance
Information &
Data Systems
Organizational
Capacity
Workforce Capacity
& Competency
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Source:  National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO).
* -- All or nearly all of the state’s local public health agencies are units of state government.
(+) -- No concurrence process, documented in writing, is currently set up in the state.
Indicator 3: State-Local Coordination
Local representatives in 35 states and
D.C. responded that the intent of the
concurrence language in the CDC guid-
ance for use of federal bioterrorism funds
was satisfactorily fulfilled (1 point)
Alabama* Montana
Alaska* North Carolina (+)
Arkansas* North Dakota
Connecticut Nebraska
Delaware* New Hampshire*
D.C. New Mexico
Florida New York
Hawaii Ohio
Iowa (+) Oklahoma (+)
Idaho (+) Pennsylvania
Kansas Rhode Island*
Kentucky South Carolina*
Louisiana* South Dakota
Maryland Tennessee (+)
Michigan Vermont*
Minnesota Washington
Missouri Wisconsin (+)
Mississippi* West Virginia
Local representatives in 15 states
responded that the intent of the concur-
rence language in the CDC guidance for
use of federal bioterrorism funds was
NOT satisfactorily fulfilled  (0 points)
Arizona (+)
California (+)
Colorado (+)
Georgia (+)
Illinois (+)
Indiana (+)
Massachusetts (+)
Maine (+)
New Jersey (+)
Nevada (+)
Oregon
Texas (+)
Utah
Virginia (+)
Wyoming (+)
FINDING: COORDINATION BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL HEALTH 
DEPARTMENTS IS STILL OFTEN STRAINED.  THIRTY PERCENT OF STATES DID NOT
OBTAIN “CONSENSUS, APPROVAL, OR CONCURRENCE” FROM LOCAL HEALTH
DEPARTMENTS ABOUT HOW THEY USED FEDERAL BIOTERRORISM FUNDS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENT OF CDC GUIDANCE.
Coordination among the different levels of
government -- federal, state, and local -- is
essential  in the event of an emergency, par-
ticularly a major or widespread emergency.  
The CDC’s “Continuation Guidance for
Cooperative Agreement on Public Health
Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism”
requires states to demonstrate “consensus,
approval, or concurrence between state and
local public health” officials and departments
concerning the use of the federal bioterror-
ism funds.15
According to a survey conducted by the
National Association of County and City
Health Officials (NACCHO), local represen-
tatives in 35 of the states responded that the
intent of the concurrence language was sat-
isfactorily fulfilled.  According to NACCHO,
in 12 of these states, all or nearly all local
public health agencies are units of state gov-
ernment.  These states were therefore
regarded as being in concurrence (and no
respondents were contacted for the survey).
Local representatives in 15 states responded
that the intent of the concurrence language
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was not satisfactorily fulfilled, indicating that
there are still challenges that exist in coordi-
nation between state and local agencies.
The data for this indicator were gathered by
NACCHO staff March-May 2004 and pertained
to implementation of the HHS guidance for FY
2003 bioterrorism preparedness funding.16
The survey also asked if there was a process
for consensus or concurrence within the state
that was documented in writing, in such a way
that an independent reviewer could conclude
accurately whether the state had fulfilled this
requirement.  Thirty-one states and D.C.
either responded that there was such a
process in place (or were among the 12 states
where nearly all local public health agencies
are units of state government and were
regarded as being in concurrence).  Nineteen
states responded that there was not such a
process in their state.  (These states are desig-
nated in the chart above with a (+) mark.)    
TEN-STATE COLLABORATIVE INITIATIVE
An integrated national preparedness effort requires collaboration, best-practice sharing, and
recognition that a bioterrorism emergency will transcend specific jurisdictional boundaries.  
Recognizing this reality, 10 Midwestern and Plains states announced in August 2004 the beginning
of an inter-state alliance to “provide mutual aid in the event of an act of bioterrorism or other
public health emergency.”17 The participating states are Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.  The collaboration 
will result in the sharing of resources across state lines to strengthen the region’s workforce, 
laboratory, communications, and response capabilities.18
CASE STUDY:  California
A study released in June 2004 by the RAND Corporation examined the response capabilities
of the California public health system to major disease outbreaks and bioterror threats.  The
study examined seven jurisdictions in the state, ranging from rural to urban, and comprising a
range of demographics.  The report characterized the state as “not adequately prepared to
deal with a major disease outbreak and other significant challenges.”19
“There was wide variation in the readiness of California’s local public health agencies to
detect and respond to a hypothetical smallpox attack... Commonly identified gaps included:
lack of information systems, significant training needs for the public health workforce, inade-
quate numbers of public health professionals, lack of knowledge of potentially vulnerable or
difficult-to-reach population subgroups, and lack of community involvement in planning.”20
CASE STUDY:  Gauging Progress in Kansas
Kansas conducted a study to gauge the progress of local health department readiness capabilities
from 2002 to 2003.21 They found improved preparedness in 89 of 103 participating counties.22
However, despite the progress made, the study found that “large disparities persist among differ-
ent areas of the state,” and that “many state focus area and critical capacity scores remain low.”23
The findings of the report are intended to help guide the state’s resource allocation and prepared-
ness planning for future years.  The study also offers an example of a model accountability initiative
-- the type of feedback mechanism necessary to ensure smart spending to address areas of need.
The data for this indicator are from a survey
conducted by ASTHO, and the results were
included in an ASTHO and Council of State
Governments report, State Public Health
Worker Shortage Report: A Civil Service
Recruitment and Retention Crisis.  The sur-
vey found that the average age of state pub-
lic health workers is 46.6, compared to the
national workforce average of 40.
The survey found that more than 25 percent
of the state public health workforce in 22
states is eligible to retire within five years.
Eight states are facing potential retiree levels
of 40 percent or more:  Indiana (48 percent);
Nebraska (45.9 percent); California (45 per-
cent); New York (45 percent); West Virginia
(43 percent); Kansas (41 percent); Wisconsin
(41 percent); and Alaska (40 percent).  
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Source:  Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO).
Note: D.C. did not respond to the survey question.
Indicator 4: Workforce
28 states have 25 percent or less of
their state public health workforce eli-
gible to retire within the next five years
(1 point)
Alabama (10%)
Arizona (18%)
Arkansas (25%)
Colorado (19.4%)
Delaware (17%)
Florida (22.8%)
Georgia (6.7%)
Hawaii (8.5%)
Idaho (12%)
Iowa (14.4%)
Kentucky (20%)
Louisiana (20.1%)
Maryland (20%)
Maine (15%)
Minnesota (19.4%)
Mississippi (20%)
Nevada (15%)
New Hampshire (19%)
New Jersey (15.7%)
New Mexico (5%)
North Carolina (12%)
North Dakota (19%)
South Carolina (23%)
South Dakota (10%)
Utah (22.9%)
Vermont (19.5%)
Virginia (18%)
Wyoming (10.2%)
22 states have more than 25 percent of
their state public health workforce eli-
gible to retire within the next five years
(0 points)
Alaska (40%)
California (45%)
Connecticut (37%)
Illinois (26.5%)
Indiana (48%)
Kansas (41%)
Massachusetts (37%)
Michigan (26%)
Missouri (27%)
Montana (33%)
Nebraska (45.9%)
New York (45%)
Ohio (30%)
Oklahoma (27.5%)
Oregon (32%)
Pennsylvania (26%)
Rhode Island (31%)
Tennessee (38.8%)
Texas (26%)
Washington (32.6%)
Wisconsin (41%)
West Virginia (43%)
FINDING: IN NEARLY HALF OF THE STATES, 25 PERCENT OR MORE OF THE
STATE PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR RETIREMENT WITHIN
THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, WHICH WILL LIKELY LEAD TO SEVERE STAFFING SHORTAGES.
EIGHT STATES ARE FACING CRITICAL RETIREE LEVELS OF 40 PERCENT OR HIGHER.
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IMPENDING PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE CRISIS
The impending mass retirement of state public health personnel is a crisis in the making.
Replacing this mature and experienced workforce with an adequate number of well-trained public
health professionals in federal, state, and local public health agencies creates a challenge for public
health that is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future. The problems this engenders will like-
ly dominate the public health policy agenda for the next generation.  
Over the next two decades, the number of retiring public health professionals will continue to
grow as the baby boomers retire. Unfortunately, the number of young professionals posi-
tioned to take their place is expected to decline at the very same time due to substantially
decreased birth rates and limited immigration.  Without a vigorous recruitment and retention
effort to make public health competitive with the private sector, state health agencies will
struggle to meet post-9/11 demands and responsibilities with substantially less human capital.
As a result, community programs may be scaled back, if not eliminated; agencies may suffer
widespread “brain drain” as retiring employees leave with vast amounts of undocumented
institutional knowledge; workforce stress levels may continue to increase; and the ability of
public health agencies to react swiftly and effectively to threats may be jeopardized.
 A 2003 report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) found that public health agencies are suf-
fering shortages of public health nurses, environmental health specialists, health educators,
epidemiologists, and administrative personnel. This report also found that the public health
system currently lacks the resources and funding to offer salaries that compete with the
private sector and is not training workers rapidly enough to replace retiring professionals.24
 A March 2003 survey by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists echoed these
concerns, finding almost half of the epidemiologists in state health departments have no
training in their area of specialty.25
 An April 2003 report on bioterrorism preparedness by the federal General Accounting
Office (now the U.S. Government Accountability Office) noted that “staffing shortages are
a major concern” and that the demands on new emergency planning activities often divert
time from the “usual activities” of public health workforce staffers.26
On July 7, 2004, Senators Charles Hagel (R-Neb.) and Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) introduced
“The Public Health Preparedness Workforce Act of 2004” to help address this prob-
lem.  No additional action was taken on this proposed legislation during the 108th Congress.
PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE IN ACTION
September 11, 2001
“...Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001... Within three days, CDC/ATSDR [Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry] [re-]deployed 34 EISOs [Epidemic Intelligence Service
Officers] and many other technical worker safety experts to New York alone and many more
across other states.  This marked the single largest deployment of EISOs to a single location in [the
agency’s] 51-year history.  Matched with immediate delivery of medical supplies using the Strategic
National Stockpile and an assortment of other services, the nation witnessed the significance of pub-
lic health’s role in protecting the health and safety of people during a terrorist event.”27
2004 Florida Hurricanes 
In the aftermath of a series of devastating hurricanes to hit Florida in the Fall of 2004, the U.S.
Public Health Service dispatched nearly 500 members of its Commissioned Corps to adminis-
ter to the health and recovery of the region and its population.  The Commissioned Corps is
a uniformed service comprised of 8,500 public health professionals who travel throughout the
nation and world in time of health emergencies.28
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Public health laboratories are central to
response efforts in the event of biological,
chemical, or radiological terrorist attacks.  Lab
professionals are charged with identifying
agents used in an attack; these findings then
drive containment, treatment, and clean-up
strategies and decisions.
According to the CDC, “clinical lab person-
nel will most likely be the first ones to per-
form preliminary testing on clinical speci-
mens from patients who have been inten-
tionally exposed [to biological, chemical, or
radiological terrorism]... and will play a crit-
ical role in facilitating rapid identification of
[the hazardous substance].”29
The term “public health laboratories” actually
refers to a “loose network of federal, state, and
local laboratories that work in undefined col-
laboration with private clinical laboratories.”30
There are approximately 2,000 public health
labs in the U.S. 
In a survey conducted by the Association of
Public Health Laboratories (APHL) in the Fall
of 2004, states were asked if they have suffi-
cient “Biosafety Level 3” (BSL-3) laboratories,
which requires enough equipment and
staffing to be able to handle “infectious agents
that may cause serious or potentially lethal dis-
ease as a result of exposure” via inhalation.31 
Sixteen states indicated that they did have suf-
ficient facilities, which is an increase from six
last year (Alabama, Minnesota, Montana,
Ohio, Utah, and Virginia). In 2004, three of
these states, Alabama, Ohio and Utah, slid
back into the “do not have sufficient facilities”
category due to facility and funding shortages.
Source:  Fall 2004 survey by the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL).
^ -- State reported sufficient capabilities in the 2003 survey.
* -- State did not respond to survey question.
Indicator 5: Laboratories -- Bioterrorism Capabilities 
16 states report that they have suffi-
cient Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laborato-
ry facilities (1 point)
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Minnesota^
Montana^
Nevada
New Hampshire
North Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia^
Wisconsin
34 states and D.C. report that they do
NOT have sufficient Biosafety Level 3
(BSL-3) laboratory facilities (0 points)
Alabama^ Missouri
Alaska Nebraska
Arizona New Jersey
Arkansas New Mexico
California New York* 
Colorado North Dakota
Delaware Ohio^
D.C. Oklahoma
Hawaii Oregon
Illinois Pennsylvania
Iowa Rhode Island
Kentucky South Carolina
Louisiana Utah^
Maine Vermont
Maryland Washington
Massachusetts West Virginia
Michigan Wyoming
Mississippi
FINDING: WHILE THE CAPABILITIES OF PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES HAVE
IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY IN THE PAST THREE YEARS, TWO-THIRDS OF THE STATES
STILL REPORT THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT BIOTERRORISM RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES (FACILITIES, TECHNOLOGY, AND/OR EQUIPMENT).   
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TFAH’s 2003 Ready or Not? report found 43
states indicating they had at least one labora-
tory equipped to handle critical biological
agents and had a “Biosafety Level-3 (BSL-3)
designation.  This demonstrates that labs
have made significant progress in having min-
imal capacity, but that many more improve-
ments and laboratories are still needed for
them to be adequately prepared for the range
of threats they are responsible for managing. 
Also, in lieu of bolstering laboratory pre-
paredness in each state, a Laboratory
Response Network (LRN) was established in
1999 to provide “surge capacity” support to
states.  Though overseen by CDC, the LRN is
an integrated network of approximately 120
labs, encompassing federal, state and local,
veterinary, military, environmental, food test-
ing, and international labs.32 Through coop-
erative agreements and collaborative pooling
of resources and personnel, the LRN is
designed to provide emergency assistance and
support - - during the anthrax attacks of 2001,
a Florida LRN lab conducted over one million
separate anthrax tests.33 Additionally, some
public health experts also note that resources
from other arenas, such as police and Federal
Bureau of Investigations laboratory facilities
would also often be used in an emergency. 
Source:  Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) survey.
Indicator 6: Laboratories -- Workforce and Testing
Capabilities 
21 states report that they have adequate
numbers of laboratory scientists to run
tests for anthrax or the plague (1 point)
Alaska Utah
Arizona Vermont
Colorado Virginia
Connecticut West Virginia
Kentucky Wisconsin
Maine Wyoming
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon
Texas
29 states and D.C. report that they do
NOT have adequate numbers of 
laboratory scientists to run tests for
anthrax or the plague (0 points)
Alabama Massachusetts
Arkansas Michigan
California Minnesota
Delaware Missouri
D.C. Nevada
Florida New Mexico
Georgia New York
Hawaii North Dakota
Idaho Ohio
Illinois Pennsylvania
Indiana Rhode Island
Iowa South Carolina
Kansas South Dakota
Louisiana Tennessee
Maryland Washington
FINDING: 29 STATES AND D.C. REPORT THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE
NUMBERS OF LABORATORY SCIENTISTS TO MANAGE TESTS FOR ANTHRAX OR THE
PLAGUE IF THERE WERE TO BE A SUSPECTED OUTBREAK.  
Public health laboratories are facing the same
critical workforce shortages as rest of public
health.  This indicator helps demonstrate the
severity of the problem.  The anthrax attacks
in Fall 2001 and the resultant “worried well”
ripple-effect phenomenon overwhelmed labo-
ratories across the country with samples of
white powder-like substances people feared
might be anthrax and highlighted the impor-
tance of maintaining expert public health lab-
oratory scientists.
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However, according to data from a survey con-
ducted by APHL in the Fall of 2004, nearly 60
percent of states and D.C. do not currently have
adequate numbers of expert laboratory scien-
tists on staff to be able to manage a single sus-
pected anthrax or plague outbreak.  The prob-
lem would be compounded in the event of a
wider scale emergency requiring “surge capaci-
ty” where the labs would be inundated with
large numbers of suspected samples to test.  
LABORATORIES -- CHEMICAL TERRORISM CAPABILITIES
Five states have sufficient capabilities
to test for chemical terrorism (not a
point indicator)
California
Michigan
New Mexico
New York
Virginia
45 states and D.C. do NOT have suffi-
cient capabilities to test for chemical
terrorism (not a point indicator)
Alabama* Missouri*
Alaska* Montana
Arizona* Nebraska*
Arkansas* Nevada*
Colorado* New Hampshire*
Connecticut* New Jersey*
Delaware* North Carolina*
D.C.* North Dakota*
Florida* Ohio
Georgia* Oklahoma
Hawaii* Oregon
Idaho* Pennsylvania*
Illinois* Rhode Island*
Indiana* South Carolina*
Iowa* South Dakota*
Kansas* Tennessee*
Kentucky Texas*
Louisiana* Utah*
Maine* Vermont*
Maryland* Washington*
Massachusetts* West Virginia*
Minnesota* Wisconsin*
Mississippi* Wyoming
FINDING: PREPARATION FOR A CHEMICAL ATTACK IS LAGGING BEHIND
BIOTERROR PREPARATIONS.  ALTHOUGH UP FROM ZERO LAST YEAR, ONLY FIVE
LABS REPORT CAPABILITIES (FACILITIES, TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT, AND/OR
STAFFING) TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO A CHEMICAL TERRORISM THREAT.  
Source:  CDC’s “Laboratory Preparedness for Emergencies: Laboratory Network for
Chemical Terrorism”36
* -- States with at least one “Tier 2” laboratory at this level (41 labs in 39 states and D.C.).  (See defi-
nition of Tier 2 in the text below).
“AS THE ANTHRAX ATTACKS DEMONSTRATED, THE NEW BIO-THREAT RESPECTS
NO BORDERS AND KNOWS NO BOUNDARIES.”
-- MAJ. GEN. LESTER MARTINEZ-LOPEZ, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH AND
MATERIEL COMMAND34
An April 2002 Pentagon report (not released until March 2004) examined Lessons Learned from the
Anthrax Attacks:  Implications for U.S. Bioterrorism Preparedness, and found “in a sweeping assessment,
[the] report identifies weaknesses in ‘almost every aspect of U.S. biopreparedness and response.’” 35
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In November 2002, the APHL conducted a
survey that found that on a 1-to-10 scale
measuring preparedness for a chemical
incident (with 10 being the most pre-
pared), 34 state labs rated themselves at a
“4” or below, while 14 others rated them-
selves as a “5” or “6.”  
In June 2003, the executive director of
the APHL commented that “if we have to
respond to a chemical terrorism event, it
will be a train wreck.  Only eight state
public health laboratories have a chemi-
cal state terrorism plan in place.  We
don’t have a national plan, or testing
methods, or a lead agency for many of the
laboratory activities that will be needed
when a crisis occurs.”39
In the June 2003 TFAH report, Public
Health Laboratories:  Unprepared and
Overwhelmed, one state lab director report-
ed that in the event of a chemical attack,
“proper identification of the [chemical]
agent [used], which drives treatment, con-
tainment, and clean-up decisions, will be
haphazard and lengthy.”40
States were restricted from using their FY
2002 bioterrorism preparedness funds for
chemical terrorism preparedness activi-
ties.  However, this changed in FY 2003
when the CDC allowed states to use these
funds to also support “Focus Area D activ-
ities, which develop laboratory chemical
testing capabilities.  But no new funds
were allocated to support these additional
improvements, so they were competing
for existing resources.  In most cases,
these resources were already devoted to
other areas.
Since then, there have been dramatic
improvements.  According to the CDC,
five states now have emergency chemical
response capabilities.  These states were
targeted to be the first labs to gain chemi-
cal testing capabilities and to serve as
“surge capacity” facilities to support the
CDC in different regions of the U.S.  Five
additional states have been targeted for a
second phase for capacity building; how-
ever, progress in this phase has been
stalled due to inadequate resources.
There are also now 62 state, territorial,
and metropolitan public health laborato-
ries participating in a “chemical laboratory
response network.”  Similarly to bioterror-
ism preparedness capabilities, participat-
ing labs receive cooperation and shared
resources from other participating states.
All of these labs have developed response
plans and have the capability to collect,
package, and ship possible chemical ter-
rorism specimens from hospitals to the
CDC for analysis. In addition, 41 laborato-
ries now have the ability to test limited
types of agents in blood or urine samples,
such as cyanide or toxic metals.  
Also similar to bioterrorism preparedness,
many public health experts note that
resources from other arenas, such as HAZ-
MAT capabilities and private, FBI, police,
defense, energy, and environmental pro-
tection laboratories would also often be
used in an emergency. 
THE CHEMICAL THREAT
“CDC has identified over 60 toxic substances that could be used as chemical weapons by terrorists.”37
According to the GAO, “chemical facilities may be attractive targets for terrorists intent on
causing harm and loss of life.  Many facilities exist in populated areas where a chemical
release could threaten thousands.  EPA reports that 123 chemical facilities located through-
out the country have toxic ‘worst case’ scenarios where more than a million people in the
surrounding area could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas if a release occurred.
To date, no one has comprehensively assessed the security of chemical facilities.”38
TESTING HUMANS
FOR EXPOSURE TO
CHEMICALS
The ability to test people who
may have been exposed to a
chemical terrorist attack or
other chemical exposures is
called “biomonitoring” in the
scientific community.
Biomonitoring is the testing of
human samples, such as blood
or urine, for chemicals or their
metabolites. This capability is
central to the core functions
of an effective public health
laboratory.  Without biomoni-
toring, the diagnosis and
treatment of chemical expo-
sures can be delayed.
Biomonitoring is also an
important tool in disease pre-
vention.  Biomonitoring helps
identify and measure which
chemicals actually get into
people’s bodies and determine
any potential links to environ-
mental factors.41 For instance,
while advancing chemical ter-
rorism preparedness capabili-
ties, the public health labora-
tories in Maine also are able
to use the equipment to
screen expectant mothers for
mercury levels in their blood-
stream, which can be elevated
to unsafe levels due to fre-
quent consumption of some
types of fish.  
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Source:  CDC.
* -- State is expected to go live with the NEDSS Base System in January 2005.
Indicator 7: Disease Tracking/Surveillance 
18 states do have a disease tracking
system in day-to-day use where infor-
mation can be collected and monitored
electronically via the Internet (1 point)
Alabama
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Kansas
Louisiana
Michigan
Missouri
Nebraska
New Jersey
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
32 states and D.C. do NOT have a dis-
ease tracking system in day-to-day use
where information can be collected and
monitored electronically via the
Internet (0 points)
Alaska Montana
Arizona Nevada*
Arkansas* New Hampshire
California New Mexico
Connecticut North Carolina
Delaware Oklahoma
D.C. Oregon*
Hawaii Rhode Island
Idaho* South Dakota
Indiana Utah
Iowa Vermont*
Kentucky Virginia*
Maine Washington
Maryland West Virginia
Massachusetts Wisconsin
Minnesota Wyoming
Mississippi
FINDING: TWO-THIRDS OF THE STATES DO NOT USE THE INTERNET TO
COLLECT DISEASE OUTBREAK INFORMATION BY NATIONAL STANDARDS, CAUSING
SERIOUS DELAYS IN REPORTING AND RENDERING RAPID OR EARLY WARNING OF
DISEASE THREATS DIFFICULT. 
Delivering effective public health services
depends on timely and reliable information.
Health departments cannot protect people
from existing or emerging health threats,
such as a new disease outbreak, without the
right information.   
Disease surveillance, also known as health
tracking, involves the ongoing, systematic
collection, analysis, and interpretation of
health-related information.  Disease surveil-
lance provides statistics on illness, disability,
and death from acute and chronic condi-
tions; injuries; personal, environmental, and
occupational risk factors; preventive and
treatment services; and program costs.  
Health tracking is essential for prevention
efforts by functioning as an early warning
signal for new and emerging conditions and
by finding connections to possible causes
and contributing factors for disease.  When
data are not available or are missing, health
problems may not be identified in high-risk
populations or interventions may not be
timely.  Disease surveillance also could be
valuable for early detection of disease out-
breaks resulting from a bioterrorist attack. 
Effective surveillance involves active coopera-
tion among federal, tribal, state, and local
health care agencies, private organizations, and
the general public.  Federal agencies take the
lead in establishing national standards for col-
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lecting public health data.  However, these
agencies are only a fraction of the many part-
ners that collect, analyze, and translate the data.   
The lack of timely data causes delays that
are highly problematic, particularly in situa-
tions that warrant immediate public health
investigations and interventions, such as a
possible foodborne disease outbreak.
Within the CDC’s efforts to create an overar-
ching Public Health Information Network,
the agency relies on the National Electronic
Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS) to inte-
grate a variety of surveillance activities and
the reporting systems for diseases such as
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, vaccine-preventable
diseases, and infectious diseases.  The system
also is intended to facilitate more accurate
and timely disease reporting to the CDC and
state and local health departments.  
The NEDSS system allows clinicians, laborato-
ries, or local health department investigators
to enter data on the Web and input the data
directly into a health department database.
This approach makes information on a report-
ed case available to health departments with-
out the delays encountered using other data
entry systems or the traditional mail-in forms.
“[The] NEDSS initiative created standards to
facilitate data collection, management, trans-
mission, analyses, access and dissemination.
Using NEDSS, CDC/ATSDR [Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry] will
promote the use of data and information sys-
tem standards to advance the development of
efficient, integrated, and interoperable sur-
veillance systems at federal, state, and local
levels.  A primary goal of NEDSS is the ongo-
ing, automatic capture and analysis of data
that are already available electronically.
NEDSS will take advantage of current IT
advances and the use of data standards to
improve our ability to monitor public health
conditions of importance.” 42
According to data from the CDC, only 18
states currently perform surveillance using
the possible Internet-data entry system.  Six
additional states -- Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada,
Oregon, Vermont, and Virginia -- are
expected to go live with the NEDSS Base
System in January 2005.
Additionally, according to the CDC, 20 states
and New York City have mechanisms that
allow for automatic electronic laboratory
result reporting (ELR) about communicable
diseases from clinical diagnostic labs to state
and local health departments.  This approach
has been shown to increase the timeliness of
reports (from 26 days to three to four days)
and the number of cases being tracked by two
to three times.  For the states that have adopt-
ed NEDSS, there are also concerns for main-
taining a trained workforce that is able to
interpret data and measure its use and impact.
Experts have called for increased NEDSS
funding and specific federal mandates to
boost state readiness and for ending the frag-
mented usage described above.  NEDSS fund-
ing was $28.7 million for both FY 2003 and FY
2004.  Funding for NEDSS was reduced to
$24.5 million in FY 2005.43 Some public health
officials argue that other tracking systems
would be preferable to NEDSS, however, most
generally agree about the strong need for stan-
dards and interoperability and that there
needs to be greater urgency placed on expe-
diting achieving such a system nationwide.
According to the GAO, “Some state offi-
cials told us that even though they have
developed electronic systems that comply
with the NEDSS standards, they have not
been able to transfer data to CDC using
their systems because the systems are still
not compatible. CDC officials said that the
national industry standards on design,
development, and data transport have
continued to evolve and they are working
with the states to receive data from those
who opted to use the NEDSS architecture
to develop their own compliant software.”
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Source:  TFAH with analytic and research support from the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities.
* -- State has statutory quarantine powers that may be enhanced or capable of expedited performance
during general or public health emergencies.
Note:  Washington state has regulatory versus statutory quarantine authority. 
See Appendix C for caveats to the quarantine analysis.
Indicator 8: Quarantine Authority 
49 states and D.C. have adequate
statutory authority to quarantine in
response to a hypothetical bioterrorism
attack scenario (1 point)
Alabama* Nebraska
Arizona* Nevada*
California New Hampshire*
Colorado New Jersey
Connecticut* New Mexico*
Delaware* New York
D.C.* North Carolina*
Florida* North Dakota
Georgia* Ohio*
Hawaii* Oklahoma*
Idaho* Oregon
Illinois* Pennsylvania*
Indiana* Rhode Island*
Iowa* South Carolina*
Kansas South Dakota*
Kentucky Tennessee*
Louisiana* Texas
Maine* Utah
Maryland* Vermont
Massachusetts* Virginia*
Michigan* Washington^
Minnesota* West Virginia*
Mississippi Wisconsin*
Missouri Wyoming*
Montana*
1 state does NOT have adequate statu-
tory authority to quarantine in
response to a hypothetical bioterrorism
attack scenario (0 points)
Alaska
FINDING: 49 STATES AND D.C. HAVE ADEQUATE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO QUARANTINE IN RESPONSE TO A HYPOTHETICAL BIOTERRORISM ATTACK.45
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TFAH and the Center examined each state’s
quarantine statutes concerning its applica-
tion to the scenario and found that 49 states
and D.C. have sufficient statutory authority
to use quarantine powers during the
described event.  Alaska presently lacks ade-
quate quarantine statutory authority.  
This analysis is based solely on information
about the states’ existing quarantine statutes
collected by Health Policy Tracking Service
(HPTS) at NETSCAN iPublishing Inc. for
TFAH, as well as the most current legislative
tracking of the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act and the Turning Point
Model State Public Health Act available
through the Center for Law and the Public’s
Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins
Universities.46
This analysis responds only to whether the
state may quarantine persons within a
defined setting because they may have been
exposed to an infectious condition.  It does
not address the state’s capacity to isolate
persons who are known to be infected.  
Isolation and quarantine are two common
public health strategies designed to protect
the public by preventing exposure to infect-
ed or potentially infected individuals.
Generally, isolation refers to the separation
of people who are known to be infected with
a contagious condition from persons who
are not infected, or the restriction of their
movement to stop the spread of that illness.
Isolation is a standard procedure used in
hospitals for patients with tuberculosis and
certain other infectious diseases.
In contrast, quarantine usually refers to the
separation and restriction of movement of
people who are not yet ill but who have been
exposed to an infectious agent and are, there-
fore, potentially infectious.  Quarantine of
exposed individuals, like isolation, is intended
to stop the spread of infectious disease.  
Mass quarantine was common in the United
States in the 19th and early 20th-centuries
when outbreaks of smallpox, scarlet fever,
cholera, and tuberculosis occurred more
frequently than today.  The practice of quar-
antine raises significant issues related to bal-
ancing civil liberties with communal goods.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld govern-
ment’s ability to quarantine individuals in
1909, saying quarantine “does not thwart
constitutional rights, since individuals have
no right to harm others.”47
In recent decades, large-scale quarantines
have largely disappeared.  A 2001 study in
The Journal of the American Medical
Association found no instance of large-scale
quarantine within U.S. borders since the
“Spanish” flu of 1918.48 As a result, “profes-
sional medical and public health familiarity
with the practice of quarantines has faded.”49
That nearly every state has quarantine statuto-
ry authority to respond to the posed hypothet-
ical scenario is partially the result of greater leg-
islative attention since 9-11.  In the wake of the
tragedies, there was a great deal of uncertainty
and calls for modernizing quarantine laws
were widespread.  However, some public health
officials express concern that states are still
unprepared for implementing quarantine.  
TFAH, in conjunction with the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns
Hopkins Universities, developed a brief, test case fact pattern for a hypothetical bioterrorist attack.
TEST CASE HYPOTHETICAL FACT PATTERN:
A hotel is hosting an annual, three-day meeting of business persons, many of whom arrive and stay at
the hotel from out-of-town locations. On the second day of the meeting, public health authorities
receive very credible information that suggests that an infectious agent has intentionally been released
at the hotel at a specific time.  The fast-acting, potentially deadly agent is easily transmitted person-to-
person via airborne and other environmental means.  Can state or local public health authorities, with
assistance from public safety authorities, immediately quarantine the occupants within the hotel?
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On April 4, 2003, President George W. Bush signed an executive order adding severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) to the list of quarantinable communicable diseases under the
Public Health Service Act.  This authority would only be used if someone posed a threat to
public health and refused to cooperate with a voluntary request.50 Agricultural quarantines
are more common in the U.S., an example being the 2003 quarantine of cow herds consid-
ered potential carriers of Mad Cow disease.51
The widespread emergence of SARS in Toronto forced Canadian authorities to wrestle with the
“real-world” impact of modern quarantine, in addition to the important legal and medical implica-
tions.  Among the logistical difficulties associated with quarantine include enforcement and com-
pliance issues -- how to account for individual behavior among a large and diverse population.  
A recent journal article studying the impact of Toronto’s SARS quarantine during the 2003 out-
break identified individuals’ stress, boredom, and wage concerns; communications difficulties
among the large-scale population and between jurisdictions; and difficulty monitoring compli-
ance as significant challenges to the quarantine’s intent.52 The study also found that, among the
population that complied with quarantine, concern over transmitting the disease was a consid-
erably more popular rationale for compliance than fear of penalties or enforcement measures.53
COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES
The CDC funds the Health Alert Network (HAN), which is a system for electronic communi-
cation among health departments and the CDC using the Internet.  The information transmit-
ted over the network allows state, local, and federal health departments to rapidly share
details about current, pending, or possible threats.
According to TFAH’s December 2003 report, Ready or Not?  Protecting the Public’s Health
in the Age of Bioterrorism, approximately 89 percent of the U.S. population is linked to the
HAN via a continuous, high-speed Internet connection.  
The next stage is to ensure rapid communications with key health partners, such as laborato-
ries, hospitals, and pharmacies.  In May 2004, the CDC found that states still had considerable
room for improvement in emergency outreach; only eight percent of states were able to con-
tact their partners within 20 minutes, while 55 percent could contact most partners and 37
percent could contact only some partners in that same time period.
Example of the Use of HAN:  Public Health Precautions Related to Mass Trauma
From an official CDC Health Advisory distributed by the HAN in March 2004:
“Based on recent events in Spain [the Madrid train bombings] and Pakistan, clinicians, hospitals,
and public health agencies should ensure that they are prepared to respond to mass trauma relat-
ed to terrorist bombings...  Mass trauma is defined as the injuries, death, disability, and emotional
stress caused by a catastrophic event, such as a large-scale natural disaster or a terrorist attack.
In the event of mass trauma, clinicians, hospitals, and public health agencies should be prepared
to treat injuries, disability, and psychological (individual and community) stress.  Clinicians, hospi-
tals, and public health agencies need to also be prepared for a large number of fatalities.”54
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EXAMPLES OF PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES/EVENTS 
AUGUST 2003-DECEMBER 2004
 Tornadoes in the Midwest.
 Hurricanes hit points along the Southeastern coast, including Florida, Louisiana, Alabama,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, South Carolina, and D.C.
 West Nile virus hit Southwest and West Coast hard for the first time.
 First case of Mad Cow disease discovered in the U.S.
 Lead levels in the Washington, D.C., water supply exceed maximum U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) recommendations, according to announcements.
 Norovirus outbreak in Maryland.
 Newhouse News Service article investigating a previously unreported memo about
improvements needed for preparedness.  The memo, written by CDC Director Julie
Gerberding at the request of Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), estimated that with “robust”
funding, the CDC could “prevent 43,000 amputations, 165,000 kidney failures and more
than 10,000 cases of eye disease among diabetics each year, reduce traffic deaths by 9,000
annually, halve the 40,000 new HIV cases that occur each year, reduce alcohol-exposed
pregnancies by two-thirds, and eliminate childhood lead poisoning by 2010.”55
 Announcement that half of expected flu vaccine for the U.S. would not be available this season.
“CDC/ATSDR is committed to leading the public health effort to protect people from all forms of
public health hazards.  By investing in resources and activities that improve public health... we ensure
that as emergency public health capacity improves, non-emergency public health improves as well.”56
“All-hazards” indicators reflect how recent
bioterrorism funding has impacted traditional
public health functions such as disease and
injury prevention, environmental health, food
and water safety, community health promo-
tion, and diagnosis and response measures.
The public health system faces a diverse range
of challenges and threats.  However, there is
significant overlap between bioterrorism readi-
ness and preparedness for traditional public
health functions.  Seasonal and pandemic flu
response capabilities are examples of how
planning and services for traditional functions
are related to bioterrorism preparedness.
Prior to 2001, officials concerned about bioter-
rorism regarded pandemic flu planning as a
good model for bioterrorism preparedness.
Now, the reverse is the case.  Bioterrorism plan-
ning is emphasized, and it is considered as a
model for pandemic flu preparedness.  The
onset of either type of crisis would require rapid
and collaborative mobilization to diagnose,
respond to, and contain the emergency.
ASTHO refers to the capabilities required for
effective bioterror response as the “scaffolding”
upon which the unique capabilities required to
deal with pandemic flu can be built.  
Annual flu vaccinations also demonstrate a
central preparedness function.  The seasonal
nature of the flu makes it a somewhat pre-
dictable event, yet the vaccine production
problems and the ongoing difficulties in vac-
cinating 20 to 40 percent of one of the most at-
risk populations for flu complications (adults
65 years and older) help demonstrate possible
similar problems that could arise in exponen-
tial proportions during a bioterror event or
major disease outbreak.  The emergence of a
deadly form of avian flu in Asia combined with
the U.S. flu vaccine shortage in Fall 2004 illus-
trates the importance of moving beyond a
siloed approach to bioterrorism planning. 
Bioterrorism funds are helping to enhance other public health capabilities, but many gaps
remain in the states’ ability to respond to unexpected natural or accidental emergencies.
C:  “ALL-HAZARDS” INDICATORS
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Source: CDC, BRFSS data 2003 and 2002. Data from 2003 are the most recent CDC data.
Indicator 9: Flu Vaccination Rates for Seniors 
38 states and D.C. increased flu vacci-
nation rates for adults 65 years and
older from 2002 to 2003 (1 point)
12 states did NOT increase flu vaccina-
tion rates for adults 65 years and older
from 2002 to 2003
State and Increase % 2002 % 2003 % State and Decrease % 2002 % 2003 %
Alabama (+5.4%) 64.8 70.2 Alaska (-3%) 69.5 66.5
Arkansas (+2%) 69 71 Arizona (-0.8% 69.7 68.9
California (+1%) 71.5 72.5 Delaware (-1.5%) 71.5 70
Colorado (+0.9%) 73.3 74. Indiana (-0.2%) 66.3 66.1
Connecticut (+2.9%) 71.4 74.3 Michigan (-0.2%) 67.7 67.5
D.C. (+4.3%) 58.7 63 Nevada (-0.3% 60.3 60
Florida (+8.9% 57 65.9 New Jersey (-1.9%) 69. 67.2
Georgia (+7.7%) 59.3 67 North Dakota (-0.9%) 73.9 73
Hawaii (+2.5%) 73.9 76.4 Pennsylvania (-1.4%) 70.5 69.1
Idaho (+5.2%) 65.1 70.3 South Carolina (-0.1%) 69.4 69.3
Illinois (+2.2%) 61.1 63.3 Tennessee (-2.5%) 71. 69.1
Iowa (+4%) 73.5 77.5 Wisconsin (-1.9%) 74 72.1
Kansas (+2.2%) 68. 70.8
Kentucky (+3.4%) 65.7 69.1
Louisiana (+11%) 57.3 68.3
Maine (+1%) 73.8 74.8
Maryland (+2.5%) 65.9 68.4
Massachusetts (+2.3%) 72.6 74.9
Minnesota (+3.7%) 76.6 80.3
Mississippi (+6%) 63 69
Missouri (+1.3%) 68.6 69.9
Montana (+5.1%) 67.7 72.8
Nebraska (+5.3%) 68.3 73.6
New Hampshire (+1.6%)72.3 73.9
New Mexico (+5.8% 66.6 72.4
New York (+3.4%) 64.6 68
North Carolina (+0.6%) 68.2 68.8
Ohio (+1.4%) 66.6 68
Oklahoma (+3.1%) 72.7 75.8
Oregon (+2.5% 68 70.5
Rhode Island (+2.6%) 73. 76.2
South Dakota (+3.7%) 72.4 77.9
Texas (+6.7% 61 67.7
Utah (+3.7%) 71.1 74.8
Vermont (+0.5% 73. 74.1
Virginia (+4.3%) 65.3 69.6
Washington (+8.4% 65 73.4
West Virginia (+3.3%) 65.8 69.1
Wyoming (+2%) 70.6 72.6
FINDING: THREE-QUARTERS OF THE STATES AND D.C. INCREASED FLU VAC-
CINATION RATES FOR ADULTS 65 YEARS AND OLDER, A LEADING AT-RISK GROUP,
FROM 2002 TO 2003.
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According to the CDC, five-to-20 percent of
Americans contract the flu, more than
200,000 people are hospitalized from flu
complications, and approximately 36,000
people die from the flu each year.57
People in certain at-risk groups are more vul-
nerable to complications from the flu, includ-
ing children six months to two years old and
adults 65 years and older.  In the 2000-2001
flu season, adults 65 years and older account-
ed for more than 90 percent of deaths.58 The
CDC annually recommends that high-risk
populations and their caretakers receive a vac-
cine at the beginning of the flu season. 
The data for this indicator are part of the
CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS), an annual telephone sur-
vey of adults over 18 years old conducted by
the health departments of all states and D.C.
The BRFSS is the primary source of infor-
mation for states and the nation on the
health-related behaviors of adults.59
Between 2002-2003, three-quarters of the
states and D.C. improved their vaccination
levels, with the most dramatic increases com-
ing in Louisiana (11 percent), Florida (8.9
percent), and Washington (8.4 percent).  
This indicator measured improvements;
however, the baseline vaccination levels vary
significantly between states.  The states with
the highest percentage of adults 65 years and
older vaccinated in 2003 were Minnesota
(80.3 percent), South Dakota (77.9 per-
cent), and Iowa (77.5 percent.)  The states
with the lowest percentages were Nevada (60
percent), D.C. (63 percent, although it had
a 4.3 percent increase in vaccination rates
for adults 65 years and older from 2002 to
2003), and Illinois (63.3 percent).
FLU VACCINE CRISIS OF 2004
The October 2004 announcement that approximately half of the expected flu vaccine for the
U.S. would not be available heightened public awareness about the fragility of the public health
system’s vaccine development system and national readiness for a fast-moving influenza epidemic.
In early October, Chiron Corporation announced it would not be able to meet demand for its
flu vaccine after problems at a British plant halted production of millions of doses.  The dose
shortage highlighted the fact that the U.S. relies on very few manufacturers to deliver the
country’s “projected need of 100 million doses.”60 As a result, CDC officials were forced to
encourage changes in the nation’s distribution procedures for the flu vaccine supply, reserving
doses only for the populations most in need.  
The shortage resulted in a focus of media and public attention on the issue, long lines at
health clinics around the country, and calls for incentives, liability reforms, and other measures
to encourage a broader range of vaccine producers.
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VACCINES:  U.S. AGAINST THE WORLD?
The 2004 flu vaccine shortage underscored two problems: The U.S. is reliant on international
vaccine manufacturers and is in “competition” with other nations for a limited supply.  This
problem would be amplified significantly during a pandemic flu crisis or another severe infec-
tious disease outbreak, when other countries would be seeking limited supplies of vaccines.    
As a result, initiatives such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, an interna-
tional coalition to support the production and delivery of children’s vaccinations, are impor-
tant models for potential widespread international vaccine collaboration during times of emer-
gency.61 The need for collaboration, along with reforms to encourage more vaccine produc-
ers through incentives and liability reforms, are bound to gain increased attention and rele-
vance as planners seek to prevent a repeat of 2004.
WHY ARE VACCINES IMPORTANT?
Vaccines are often cited as one of the top public health accomplishments of the 20th century.62
Immunizations are very cost-effective; prevention of illness saves direct and indirect medical costs. 
According to the CDC, every dollar spent on immunizations, including flu vaccinations, saves
$6.30 in direct medical costs, with an aggregate savings of $10.5 billion.  When including indi-
rect costs to society (a measurement of losses due to missed work, death, and disability) as
well as direct medical costs, the CDC found that every dollar spent on immunizations saves
$18.40, producing an aggregate savings of $42 billion.63
Flu vaccines similar to those currently in use were first introduced during the 1940s.  “Since that
time, they have been improved in terms of their standardization and purity.  Throughout, they
have been produced by inoculating the current influenza virus strains into embryonated hens’
eggs for vaccine production.”64 The influenza vaccine available each year is carefully engineered
to respond to the particular strains of flu judged most likely to emerge based on projections and
prior outbreaks’ genetic composition.  However, the creation of a vaccine to combat a particular
flu season is an annual “best guess” by virologists.  It takes approximately six to eight months to
develop yearly seasonal flu vaccines or vaccines for new strains of the disease. 
In 1976, 37 U.S. companies manufactured vaccines.  In 2002, there were only three.  Reasons
given for the decline are mostly economic.  Vaccine production can take decades of research
and development and, according to industry estimates, costs about $800 million per licensed
vaccine.  Concerns about potential liability impact manufacturers’ decisions to avoid vaccine
production, especially after the huge compensation claims that followed the swine flu immu-
nization program in the mid-1970s.  Some companies also cite insufficient market size as a
reason to stay out of the vaccine market, due to the current low incidence of many diseases
in the U.S., such as malaria and tuberculosis.  Providing liability protection for vaccines against
bioterrorism threats such as smallpox is separate from the existing liability protection under
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program created in 1988 for individuals who may
be thought to be injured by routine childhood vaccines.  
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The arrival of a major influenza pandemic
would cause mass casualties and disorder to
the U.S. health and economic systems.
Today, a pandemic flu outbreak in the U.S.
could cause an estimated 88,000 to 227,000
deaths65 and the estimated economic impact
would be “$71.3 to $166.5 billion, excluding
disruptions to commerce and society.”66
(See the estimated state death and hospital-
ization rates in the chart below).
The seasonal flu that emerges each year is
typically a strain of the virus similar to previ-
ous strains.  However, new strains can
emerge that people are less resistant to, lead-
ing to more severe levels of illness and to a
“pandemic” of the disease.  It would require
scientists approximately six months or more
to develop and produce a vaccine for a new
strain of the flu.  The “Spanish” flu pandem-
ic of 1918 killed 550,000 Americans in 10
months and 30 million people worldwide.67
New strains of infectious disease often
emerge from animal populations, such as
birds or pigs.  The recent emergence of
the avian or “bird” flu, given the ability of
this specific strain of influenza to
exchange genes with a human flu virus,
has public health officials worried about
the emergence of a pandemic capable of
causing chaos and casualties in the hun-
dreds of thousands.68
Most public health officials call the emer-
gence of a new lethal strain of the flu “an
inevitability.”69 During a news conference
announcing his resignation, departing HHS
Secretary Tommy Thompson called a pan-
demic flu “a really huge bomb out there that
could adversely impact on the health care of
the world.”70 Despite these concerns, 20
states and D.C. do not have publicly avail-
able plans in place to respond to a pandem-
ic flu outbreak that meet recommended
Source:  CDC and survey of states conducted by TFAH.
* -- State received a point for having a pandemic flu plan in the 2003 Ready or Not? report.
Indicator 10: Pandemic Flu Plans 
30 states report having a publicly 
available plan for confronting the 
emergence of a new lethal strain of
influenza, often referred to as 
“pandemic flu”  (1 point)
Arizona* Missouri*
California* Montana
Connecticut Nebraska
Delaware New Hampshire*
Florida* New Jersey*
Georgia* North Carolina
Idaho North Dakota
Indiana* Ohio
Kansas Oregon
Kentucky Pennsylvania
Maryland* South Carolina*
Massachusetts* Tennessee*
Michigan Virginia*
Minnesota* Washington
Mississippi Wisconsin
20 states and D.C. did NOT have a
publicly available plan for confronting
the emergence of a new lethal strain of
influenza, often referred to as “pan-
demic flu”  (0 points)
Alabama South Dakota
Alaska Texas
Arkansas Utah
Colorado Vermont
D.C. West Virginia
Hawaii Wyoming
Illinois
Iowa
Louisiana
Maine
Nevada
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
FINDING: MORE THAN HALF OF THE STATES HAVE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
PANDEMIC FLU PLANS IN PLACE, A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE FROM 13 STATES IN 2003.
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guidelines.  In 2003, only 13 states had plans
meeting recommended guidelines.  The
public availability of the plans is important
to ensure that members of the public and
other stakeholders (such as hospitals and
doctors) who would be central to the
response efforts are well-informed, pre-
pared, and integrated into planning.  The
data for this indicator are from the CDC and
self-reports by state health departments to
TFAH.  There was no analysis performed to
evaluate the quality of the plans.
“AS CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE, I HELD A HEARING [IN
FEBRUARY 2004] TO EXAMINE WHAT ACTIONS AND PLANNING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN
TAKEN BY FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL HEALTH OFFICIALS TO HANDLE THIS YEAR’S FLU SEASON
AND OTHER COMMUNICABLE DISEASE OUTBREAKS.  THE MAIN QUESTION I ASKED WAS, ‘ARE
WE READY FOR A LARGER SCALE OUTBREAK, WHETHER IT’S A FLU EPIDEMIC OR A BIOTERRORIST
ATTACK?’  WHILE I DON’T WANT ANYONE TO PANIC, THE ANSWER IS SIMPLY NO.”
-- U.S. REP. TOM DAVIS (R-VA.)71
“THE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO OUTBREAKS OF EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE
SUCH AS SARS COULD BE IMPROVED BY THE COMPLETION OF FEDERAL AND STATE
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC RESPONSE PLANS THAT ADDRESS PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE
PURCHASE, DISTRIBUTION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF SUPPLIES OF VACCINES AND
ANTIVIRAL DRUGS DURING AN OUTBREAK.”
-- GAO72
Bioterrorism
 Little to no warning
 Event will be in specific, initially concen-
trated areas
 Transmission mainly at or near exposure
source
 Casualties expected: Hundreds to thousands
 First responders vulnerable
 Assistance available from unaffected states
Pandemic Influenza
 Warning: Days or weeks 
 Event will be nationwide and worldwide
 Transmission will be unlimited by geography
 Casualties expected: Tens of thousands to
hundreds of thousands
 First responders vulnerable
 All states affected, all states’ resources will like-
ly be strained and unavailable to assist others
COMPARING A BIOTERRORISM ATTACK TO PANDEMIC FLU
Source: CDC
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The National Vaccine Program Office at the
CDC has a computer model that estimates a
range of impacts of a pandemic flu on specif-
ic states.   Called FluAid, this software offers a
variety of preparedness planning functions,
including state-by-state estimated death and
hospitalization figures for different levels of
contraction rates.  Though FluAid is specula-
tive and makes no attempt to project the spe-
cific spread of a pandemic through a popula-
tion, it provides a much needed illustration
that a pandemic would be a devastating
nationwide occurrence, taking a massive toll
on the nation’s health and economy.76
Estimated Impact of a Pandemic
FEDERAL PANDEMIC FLU PLAN DRAFT RELEASED FOR PUBLIC 
COMMENT IN 2004
In August 2004, HHS released a draft plan of U.S. strategy to combat the emergence of a pan-
demic influenza.  The plan minimally offers technical assistance, an overview of proposed col-
laboration among jurisdictions, and preparedness and response guidance for federal, state, and
local health officials and related private-sector partners.73
Officials began work to update the initial 1978 pandemic flu plan in 1993.  Coordinated by the
National Vaccine Program Office, the U.S. Working Group on Influenza Pandemic
Preparedness and Emergency Response updated the plan to account for technological break-
throughs and lessons learned in the past 25 years.74 While the draft plan is comprehensive
and contemporary, the 11-year gap between the plan’s conception and release is unsettling.  
The plan is designed to:
1. Decrease the burden of disease;
2. Minimize social disruption; and
3. Reduce economic impact.75
The draft plan is accessible on the HHS Web site at www.dhhs.gov/nvpo/pandemics. 
According to an article by CDC scientists:
“Using death rates, hospitalization data,
and outpatient visits, we estimated 89,000
to 207,000 deaths; 314,000 to 734,000
hospitalizations; 18 to 42 million outpatient
visits; and 20 to 47 million additional 
illnesses. Patients at high risk (15% of 
the population) would account for 
approximately 84% of all deaths. 
The estimated economic impact would be
$71.3 to $166.5 billion, excluding 
disruptions to commerce and society.”77
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THE ESTIMATED DEATHS AND HOSPITALIZATIONS PER STATE OF A
PANDEMIC FLU HITTING 35 PERCENT OF THE U.S. POPULATION
Most Likely Numbers of Deaths and Hospitalizations at 35 Percent Rate of Contraction
State Projected Number of Deaths Projected Number of Hospitalizations
Alabama 4,146 18,008
Alaska 414 2,127
Arizona 4,305 18,515
Arkansas 2,496 10,574
California 28,409 127,442
Colorado 3,356 15,390
Connecticut 3,292 13,969
Delaware 703 3,062
D.C. 539 2,321
Florida 16,667 66,447
Georgia 6,372 29,359
Hawaii 1,142 4,933
Idaho 1,064 4,740
Illinois 11,070 48,411
Indiana 5,515 24,133
Iowa 2,908 12,175
Kansas 2,505 10,745
Kentucky 3,700 16,216
Louisiana 3,890 17,336
Maine 1,237 5,288
Maryland 4,647 20,767
Massachusetts 6,130 26,151
Michigan 9,158 40,136
Minnesota 4,342 19,032
Mississippi 2,503 10,982
Missouri 5,261 22,512
Montana 841 3,634
Nebraska 1,606 6,859
Nevada 1,513 6,745
New Hampshire 1,089 4,808
New Jersey 7,924 33,970
New Mexico 1,513 6,768
New York 17,594 75,828
North Carolina 6,994 30,631
North Dakota 640 2,704
Ohio 10,825 46,657
Oklahoma 3,188 13,709
Oregon 3,138 13,555
Pennsylvania 12,686 52,573
Rhode Island 1,042 4,323
South Carolina 3,487 15,392
South Dakota 727 3,080
Tennessee 5,075 22,250
Texas 16,391 74,968
Utah 1,584 7,423
Vermont 552 2,433
Virginia 6,115 27,474
Washington 5,091 22,685
West Virginia 1,890 7,939
Wisconsin 4,956 21,393
Wyoming 427 1,907
Source:  TFAH calculations using HHS FluAid computer program.78
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MAJOR NEW FLU OUTBREAKS OF THE 20TH CENTURY
1918 -- “Spanish” flu pandemic killed 500,000 in the U.S., 30 million worldwide.
1957-58 -- Outbreak spread from China across the globe, killing approximately 70,000 in the
U.S.
1968-69 -- “Hong Kong” flu killed approximately 34,000 in the U.S.79
1997 -- The first identification of the avian “bird” flu, which remains active in Asia.80
Based on historical trends and projections, virologists and epidemiologists speculate a new flu
pandemic will emerge three to four times each century.81
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Despite the investment in dollars, there is
still little consensus about the identity of the
nation’s most pressing bio-preparedness
problems, about priorities, and the cost of
fully funding the solutions.  Federally direct-
ed bio-preparedness must be based upon:
 Accountability: Three years after a series
of landmark laws were enacted to fund
bio-preparedness, there are still no for-
mal, consistent national performance
measures for usage and tracking of feder-
al bioterrorism funds.  Performance
measures are needed to provide a clear
view of preparedness and to determine
which programs need improvement.
 Clear Consensus of Bio-threat Priorities:
The lack of an articulated “bio-game
plan” and a clear understanding of needs
have led to a reliance on stopgap, high-
profile initiatives.  It is critically important
to develop a shared vision of planning,
benchmarks, and goals, and to clearly
delineate roles and responsibilities.
Several new initiatives have led to a shuf-
fling of funds at the state level and a
resultant scramble to re-focus state and
local planning and priorities.
 Recognition of Vital Services: The
emphasis on high-profile bio-prepared-
ness initiatives, such as the smallpox
immunization campaign of 2003, has
obscured the persistent gaps in the basic
protections needed to defend against a
terrorist attack.  The GAO, IOM, and
CDC have been among the groups citing
the continued weaknesses in the essential
components of a prepared national pub-
lic health system.
 Consistent Stakeholder Input: The
adoption of several preparedness initia-
tives has been conducted without clear
input from state and local experts, the
actual implementers of the policies
directed from the federal level.  As a
result, imposed guidelines are often
developed without knowledge of what
they will mean in specific jurisdictions. 
An Overview of 
Federal Bioterrorism
Preparedness
The federal government’s $3-billion investment in bioterrorism prepared-ness demonstrates how national leaders understand the seriousness of
the bio-threat and are committed to the concept of preparedness.  To fully
maximize the nation’s protection, however, bio-preparedness initiatives must
further incorporate accountability, transparency, and feedback mechanisms.  
2C H A P T E R
“COMMENTING ON THE PUBLIC
HEALTH PREPAREDNESS SIDE, I WOULD
SAY THE GREATEST CHALLENGE IS
GETTING AND KEEPING AGREEMENT
ON THREATS AND PRIORITIES OF
THE THREATS.”
-- DR. WILLIAM F. RAUB, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, HHS82
40
During the past three years, federal officials
have unveiled a series of high-profile bio-pre-
paredness programs such as BioWatch,
BioSense, Project BioShield, the Cities
Readiness Initiative, the Strategic National
Stockpile, and the smallpox immunization
campaign.  Each initiative has been greeted
with a mixture of commendation and criticism.
BioWatch
BioWatch is a system that tests the air in sever-
al major metropolitan areas for biological
agents that terrorists might use.  The system
uses special filters on existing EPA air-quality
monitoring stations.83 The filters routinely col-
lect air samples which technicians then ship to
public health laboratories for testing.
BioWatch is administered by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), in partnership
with the EPA and HHS.  Funding for
BioWatch and related biosurveillance activi-
ties amounts to $118 million in FY 2005.84
While “consequence management” guidelines
have recently been developed for managing
response activities to “positive” BioWatch
warnings, additional guidance is still needed.
BioSense
BioSense is a public health surveillance initia-
tive administered by the CDC and launched in
October 2003.  Its goal is to rapidly detect bio-
logical terrorism or a disease outbreak.
BioSense is intended to serve as a “coordinated
multi-departmental biosurveillance program...
for early detection and quantification of a
bioterrorism event or disease outbreak, based
on the analysis of diagnostic and pre-diagnostic
health data from which patient identifiers have
been deleted.”85 Such data include over-the-
counter drug sales, clinical laboratory tests
ordered, diagnoses from doctors visits, nurses
calls, and laboratory information from the
Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and
the CDC’s Laboratory Response Network.86
A recent report from the GAO cited
BioSense and other syndromic surveillance
systems as “costly to maintain and still large-
ly untested.”87 Additionally, the GAO noted
that syndromic surveillance systems’ sensi-
tivity “makes them more likely to issue false
alarms, which in turn have the potential to
overtax public health systems.”88
The President’s proposed FY05 budget
included $130 million for BioSense;
Congress provided slightly less than $80 mil-
lion for biosurveillance activities, including
the BioSense initiative.89
Project BioShield
Enacted in July 2004, Project BioShield is a
10-year, $5.6-billion program to develop and
produce new vaccines and countermeasures
against potential bioweapons.90 It provides
private industry with incentives to research
and develop bioterrorism countermeasures,
expedites research and development at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), gives
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approval to administer unproven drugs in
the event of a crisis, and creates a fund for
government purchase of vaccines needed to
respond to an attack.91
The first initiative enacted under Project
BioShield was an $877-million agreement
with VaxGen, Inc., to produce 75 million
doses of anthrax vaccine.92 Future plans for
Project BioShield include federal purchases
of a plague vaccine, botulinum vaccine, anti-
radiation drugs, and chemical antidotes.93
An October 2004 study by the Center for
Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center and the Sarnoff Corporation
characterized BioShield as “a first step” and
“not sufficient to fully engage industry or
produce the countermeasures” needed to
protect the U.S. from a biological attack or
natural epidemic.  A common concern
about the project is that it does not address
liability concerns of the manufacturers
developing the vaccines, drugs and antidotes
who could be subject to lawsuits due to
adverse side effects or lack of efficacy.94 Less
than 100 companies have expressed an inter-
est in pursuing the development of biolog-
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ics, according to Senator Judd Gregg (R-
N.H.), chairman of the Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions.95
Many public health experts express concern
that there was no corresponding effort to
improve readiness for distribution or
administration of vaccines and antidotes in
the event of emergencies.
Cities Readiness Initiative
In June 2004, a coalition of federal agencies
led by HHS announced a new plan aimed at
enhancing the nation’s ability to respond to
public health emergencies. The plan, the
Cities Readiness Initiative, involves a pilot pro-
gram that is helping 21 cities across the U.S.
to put in place well-developed and coordinat-
ed plans for responding to terrorist attacks or
other public health emergencies.  In addition
to HHS, the other agencies involved are DHS
and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS).96
According to HHS, “[T]he goal of this ini-
tiative will be to aid cities in increasing their
capacity to deliver medicines and medical
supplies during a large-scale catastrophic
event. There are six objectives that need to
be met in order to reach this goal:
 Build and sustain the capacity to provide
antibiotics to a city’s entire population
within 48 hours of a decision to do so.
 Integrate distribution of antibiotics between
the Points of Dispensing System and, if
appropriate, federal assets such as the USPS.
 Institute communications systems to
direct, mobilize, and continually inform
the public about antibiotic distribution.
 Integrate all relevant emergency plans
and services within a city (for example,
fire, police, emergency medical, and pub-
lic health departments).
 Sustain long-term capacity to distribute
medicines through exercise, training,
technical assistance, and other tools.
 Establish security procedures to protect
the people, locations, and materials
involved in the delivery of antibiotics.”97
To fund the Cities Readiness Initiative, HHS
redirected a portion of FY04 state bioterror-
ism preparedness funds intended for states to
21 cities.98 The total amount HHS redirected
from state preparedness funds in June 2004
was $54.9 million.  Of this amount, $39 mil-
lion went to the Cities Readiness Initiative,
$27 million of which was returned to states to
administer to cities.  The remainder was allo-
cated to BioSense and to build toward the
goal of increasing the number of the CDC’s
Quarantine Stations from eight to 25 to
guard against infectious diseases such as
SARS or avian flu.99
One aspect of the Cities Readiness Initiative
calls for a reliance on U.S. postal workers to
distribute emergency antibiotics, which can
be viewed as an example of shifting funds
and focus away from public health funda-
mentals.  While it may be creative, this com-
ponent of the plan fails to acknowledge or
address the real problem:  Public health and
emergency response workforces are under-
staffed and underfunded.  
Most public health officials agree that there is
a strong remaining need to bolster local pre-
paredness and to provide additional support
for areas that are considered particularly at-
risk targets.  Dr. William F. Raub, acting assis-
tant secretary for public health emergency
preparedness, HHS, points out that “all ter-
rorism is local” and that “local preparedness is
vital” since “neither state nor federal govern-
ment resources will be available immediately”
in the event of an attack.”100  
However, concern was expressed by a num-
ber of public health experts that while the
need to provide more support for cities and
communities is critical, that this funding
should not come at the expense of already
stretched funds that were intended for
states.  The National Governors Association,
the American Public Health Association,
and the Association of State and Territorial
Health Officials were among the groups
issuing statements opposing the reprogram-
ming, calling instead for supplemental
funds to support cities and localities. 
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Biodefense for the 21st Century 
On April 21, 2004, President Bush signed a
classified directive to coordinate existing
bioterrorism government programs and ini-
tiatives. This directive, Biodefense for the
21st Century, aims to integrate the national
homeland security, medical, public health,
intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforce-
ment communities.102 The directive is the
result of the Bush Administration’s review of
the government’s response to September 11
and the anthrax attacks.103  
The directive includes 59 instructions for
government agencies, ranging from deter-
mining effective strategies for communicat-
ing evacuation orders to individuals, includ-
ing non-English speakers, to analyzing intel-
ligence from unrelated sources.  The direc-
tive also instructs agencies on how to best
shore up the nation’s defenses against a bio-
logical attack.  For example, the directive
instructs the NIH to anticipate the possible
use of genetically engineered pathogens
that could be used as weapons and to devel-
op vaccines that offer protection against sev-
eral diseases with one shot.104 
This plan also directs the DHS to establish a
National Biosurveillance Group to track and
assess threats, conduct a biological net assess-
ment of biodefense effectiveness every four
years, perform a bi-annual risk assessment of
new threats, expand international prevention
efforts, and develop an early-warning system
to detect threats against the water supply.105  
Strategic National Stockpile
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is a
national repository of antibiotics, chemical
antidotes, antitoxins, other pharmaceuti-
cals, and medical supplies and equipment
to be used in the event of a terrorist attack
or major natural disaster.106 The stockpile
is managed jointly by HHS and the DHS.
The stockpile was originally operated under
HHS’s jurisdiction.  In FY 2003 it was shifted
to the DHS.  In FY 2004, the SNS became a
joint initiative.  In 2004, the stockpile
responsibility was given back to HHS.  The
stockpile can be deployed through “12-hour
Push Packages” or “vendor management
inventory (VMI)” supplies.  Push Packages
can be delivered anywhere in the U.S. with-
in 12 hours.  
State and local first responders and health
officials can use the SNS to bolster their
response to a national emergency.  Once
SNS supplies arrive, the HHS transfers
authority for distribution to state and local
officials.  A team of five to six federal tech-
nical advisors, a unit consisting of pharma-
cists, emergency responders and logistics
experts, helps advise local authorities about
receiving, distributing, and replenishing
SNS material.  The federal government is
coordinating the “roll out” schedule based
on a three-year time line for the evaluation
of states’ stockpile distribution and adminis-
tration preparedness capabilities. 
Currently, only six states have achieved
“green” readiness status with adequate
capacity to deliver and administer vaccines
and antidotes from the stockpile in the
event of an emergency -- Florida, Illinois,
Louisiana, and three undisclosed states.
“WE SHOULDN’T HAVE TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN FILLING THE NATIONAL
VACCINE STOCKPILE OR HAVING A
WARNING SYSTEM AT THE STATE AND
LOCAL LEVEL,”101
-SENATOR EVAN BAYH (D-IND.), AS QUOTED
IN THE WASHINGTON POST, MAY 21, 2004
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Smallpox Vaccination Initiative
On Jan. 24, 2003, the CDC launched a nation-
al campaign to vaccinate emergency and med-
ical workers, on a voluntary basis, against small-
pox.  The disease was eradicated worldwide in
the 1970s, but samples of the virus were kept at
two World Health Organization (WHO) repos-
itory labs (one at the CDC and one in Koltsovo,
Russia).  According to the CDC, there is con-
cern that the samples could be obtained by ter-
rorists and used as a bioweapon.108     
The goal of the smallpox vaccination cam-
paign was to immunize 500,000 health work-
ers in 30 days and up to 10 million addi-
tional health workers and emergency
response personnel (including fire and
police) over a one-year period.109 However, as 
of October 2004, less than 40,000 medical
and emergency personnel had received the
vaccine.110 According to the GAO’s April
2003 report, Smallpox Vaccination:
Implementation of National Program Faces
Challenges, health workers were concerned
about the health risks of the vaccinations to
themselves and their families.111  
The HHS is now requiring states to be pre-
pared to immunize their entire population
in 10 days.  Public health officials in several
states have said that the 10-day goal would
be challenging.112 Enough smallpox vaccine
has been acquired to immunize an estimat-
ed 300 million individuals and this vaccine is
now included in the national stockpile.
“As an SNS package is delivered, a CDC/ATSDR team of technical advisors will also deploy.
Known as a Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU), this team is comprised of emergency
responders and logistics experts that will advise local authorities on receiving, distributing, dis-
pensing, replenishing, and recovering SNS materials.  Success Story:  On September 11, 2001,
the Strategic National Stockpile (formerly the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile) delivered
fifty tons of medical supplies, including prophylaxis and intravenous fluid, to New York City
within seven hours of the attack on the World Trade Center.  Between October 15 and
December 30, the stockpile helped deliver 3.79 million tablets of three key antibiotics --
amoxicillin, ciprofloxacin and doxycycline -- for postexposure preventive treatment of postal
workers, mail handlers, and other occupants of affected buildings.  Established in 1999, these
were the stockpile’s first-ever deployment.”107
There have been concerns that the smallpox vaccination effort may have diverted
attention from other public health priorities.  In order to achieve the smallpox vaccina-
tion goals, state and local public health officials reportedly redirected staff and resources to
the vaccination effort.  For example, Arlington County, Va., reduced home visits to at-risk
infants and pregnant women and cut staff at family planning clinics in an attempt to meet
established vaccination timelines.  In Michigan, officials diverted funding from the development
of a statewide public health surveillance system.113
Smallpox is an extremely contagious disease that can lead to skin lesions, permanent
scarring and serious illness.  Fatality rates can be as high as 30 percent.  
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State Number of Approximate number 
individuals vaccinated114 vaccinated per capita
COB 10/31/04 One in every... 
Alabama 503 8,948
Alaska 96 6,759
Arizona 39 143,098
Arkansas 1,138 2,395
California 1,854 19,139
Colorado 224 20,316
Connecticut 704 4,948
Delaware 109 7,500
D.C. 105 5,366
Florida 4,041 4,212
Georgia 175 49,627
Hawaii 181 6,948
Idaho 200 6,832
Illinois 376 33,653
Indiana 765 8,099
Iowa 492 5,984
Kansas 448 6,079
Kentucky 848 4,856
Louisiana 1,107 4,062
Maine 63 20,726
Maryland 752 7,326
Massachusetts 177 36,347
Michigan 925 10,897
Minnesota 1,476 3,428
Mississippi 403 7,150
Missouri 1,253 4,553
Montana 144 6,372
Nebraska 1,470 1,183
Nevada 17 131,833
New Hampshire 331 3,890
New Jersey 671 12,874
New Mexico 238 7,877
New York 1,167 16,444
North Carolina 1,312 6,408
North Dakota 415 1,527
Ohio 1,921 5,953
Oklahoma 376 9,339
Oregon 115 30,953
Pennsylvania 308 40,148
Puerto Rico 29 133,742
Rhode Island 36 29,893
South Carolina 998 4,155
South Dakota 737 1,037
Tennessee 2,429 2,405
Texas 4,632 4,775
Utah 288 8,165
Vermont 130 4,762
Virginia 914 8,081
Washington 554 11,068
West Virginia 734 2.466
Wisconsin 763 7,172
Wyoming 414 1,211
TOTAL 39,597
Source: Smallpox Vaccination Program Status by State, CDC.
The following is a breakdown of the number of individuals vaccinated by each state during
the smallpox initiative and the per capita rate this represents.
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WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN?  
PEDIATRIC PREPAREDNESS FOR A BIOTERRORISM EVENT 
“Dr. Marianne Gausche-Hill, a Torrance, Calif., emergency physician, said she is occasionally
confronted with a child who has shrunken pupils, lips coated in saliva, and clothes soaked with
urine.  In most cases, the diagnosis is accidental fertilizer poisoning. But these days she can’t
help but wonder: Could this signal a chemical attack? Are more sick children on the way?
‘You typically don’t look at children as targets....But you have to think they could be.’”115
Pediatricians often say, “children are not small
adults.”  Children are anatomically, physiologi-
cally, developmentally, and psychologically more
vulnerable to a bioterrorism event.  
 Some chemical warfare agents, like sarin,
are heavier than air which allows them to
accumulate closer to the breathing area of
children while their increased rate of
breathing exposes them to larger doses of
aerosolized bioterrorism agents when com-
pared to adults. They have thinner and
therefore more permeable skin than adults
which leaves them more vulnerable to
chemical irritant agents that are absorbed
through the skin.  Children have decreased
fluid reserve which puts them at greater risk
for dehydration resulting from vomiting and
diarrhea and are at higher risk for shock
after even small amounts of blood loss.
 Children may have difficulties fleeing the site of
a terrorist attack either because they cannot
walk or run as swiftly or they may have trou-
ble figuring out different ways to escape or
understanding instructions they may receive.  
 In a mass casualty incident, children are
more likely to experience post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) and more likely to
suffer psychological trauma after witness-
ing injury and death than an adult.
 are often ill-prepared to handle the influx
of pediatric patients that may present fol-
lowing a bioterrorist attack, especially
considering that children possess unique
vulnerabilities to a bioterrorism event that
place them at higher risk for disability
when compared to adults.  
 Only 20 percent of American hospitals have
Pediatric Emergency Medicine-trained
physicians,116 and, as of 2001, less than half of
hospital emergency departments were
reported to have the necessary equipment
to stabilize multiple ill and injured children.117
 Children typically require different
dosages or formulations of antibiotics
and antidotes than adults, however most
medical providers are not familiar with
the differences required.
With these unique risks and needs in mind, the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act, enacted in 2003,
arranged for the formation of a committee to
advise HHS on the impact of terrorism on chil-
dren.  The National Advisory Committee on
Children and Terrorism (NACCT) was created
and comprised of experts and professional organ-
izations from the fields of public health, pediatrics,
psychiatry, emergency management, and child
advocacy.  In June of 2003, the NACCT made the
following recommendations to the HHS:118
1. “There is a need for a comprehensive pub-
lic health strategy to meet needs of children
in planning and responding to terrorism
with specific focus on children and families;
2. Funding decisions should specifically
account for children’s needs;
3. Create structures for oversight and response
in HHS to needs of children and families;
4. Significant new pediatric and psychosocial
initiatives are needed to address the needs
of the nation’s children and families in light
of continued threat of terror events;  
5. Addressing the needs of children and fam-
ilies in the face of terrorism should be rec-
ognized as an essential part of America’s
national security response to terrorism.” 
The NACCT stressed the importance of the
preparedness of the healthcare system, from the
schools to the hospitals to the community to the
government itself, to respond to terrorism as it
relates to children.  The committee also made
recommendations regarding the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS) and the changes neces-
sary to be able to accommodate appropriate
antibiotic and antidote formulations and doses
for pediatric victims of a bioterrorism event.  
Using these recommendations, funding has
been requested for FY 2005 for the Public
Health and Social Services Emergency Fund,
which will provide support for a number of
pediatric preparedness initiatives to protect
America’s children, however a stronger mech-
anism should be established to ensure the com-
mittees recommendations are carried out.
46
A WORD OF CAUTION: APPLICATION OF NATIONAL PLANNING
Preparedness plans are only as effective as their implementation.  Real-world decisions by the
general public and local health officials will decide if a protocol is adhered to or ignored.  For
this reason, plan development must take into account the feedback and input of these popula-
tions in structuring specific plans.
A study by the Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health found that dur-
ing a “dirty bomb” or smallpox attack, preparedness protocols would not be widely followed:
“Our study found that far fewer people than needed would follow protective instructions in
these terrorist attack situations... The reason is not that they are ignorant or misinformed or
that they want to be uncooperative.  We found, instead, that there are critical problems with
the plans.  Because current plans have been developed without the direct involvement of the
public, they do not account for all the risks people would face.  Consequently, the plans make
it very difficult for people to decide on the best course of action to protect themselves and
their family.”119
-- Testimony of Dr. Roz D. Lasker before the Council of the District of Columbia Committee
on the Judiciary
MENTAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS
The mental health impact of a bioterrorism event is an important, but often-overlooked,
component of bioterrorism preparedness.  Retired head of HHS’s Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) Emergency Coordination, Dr. Brian Flynn,
called the “footprint of behavioral health consequences...far greater than the medical footprint
in terrorist and bioterrorist events.”120 The FY 2003 budget allocated $10 million to SAMSHA
to enable planning for the psychological and behavioral impact of a major threat or attack.121  
The IOM and Center for Biosecurity are among several experts calling for increased attention
and resources towards the psychological aftermath of an attack:
“The nation’s mental health, public health, medical, and emergency response systems currently
are not able to meet the psychological needs that result from terrorism...Management of the
psychological consequences of terrorism will require a range of interventions at multiple levels
involving a variety of service providers.”122 
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Congress should immediately undertake a
review of the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of
2002 (Public Law 107-188), which must be
reauthorized by the end of FY 2006.  The
Act needs adjustments and improvements.  
Given the current strains on federal, state,
and local budgets, greater emphasis must be
placed on leveraging bioterrorism pre-
paredness funds to maximize their effective-
ness in improving the overall health of com-
munities.  Additionally, Congress and the
public deserve more information about the
impact of bioterrorism funding in order to
measure how much safer these dollars are
making us.  Investing in preparedness and
prevention makes economic sense; avoiding
disease and destruction will save the cata-
strophic costs of treating Americans for ill-
ness and injury suffered in a public health
emergency.  
Assessments and improvements to the cur-
rent law should include:
 A systemic review of ongoing prepared-
ness gaps and a better understanding of
how to target resources to “jump start”
improvements.
 An assessment of essential preparedness pro-
grams and services, how much support these
require on a continuing basis, and how to
ensure that these programs keep pace with
and employ technological advances.
 Strike a better balance between state and
local needs, so that efforts complement
rather than compete for limited
resources, and ensure that efforts are effi-
cient and streamlined, while respectful of
jurisdictional authorities.
 Avoid unfunded mandates.
 Require measurable performance stan-
dards of accountability to demonstrate
progress and use of funds.  In order to
be eligible to continue receiving federal
bioterrorism preparedness funds, states
should be required to demonstrate 1)
how they have used these federal funds
to make tangible improvements based
on the developed standards, and 2) how
they have assured a “maintenance of
effort,” meaning that they are support-
ing their state’s ongoing public health
needs and programs.  Linking perform-
ance and accountability to funding also
provide important incentives for achiev-
ing progress.
1. BUILD A BETTER BIO-GAME PLAN
Now is the time to figure out what isn’t ready and to ask if we’re getting what we’ve been
paying for.  Reauthorization of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act should focus on maximiz-
ing return of investment of every funding dollar.
Recommendations
While the federal funds for bioterrorism preparedness have resultedin rapid and substantial improvements, many striking gaps and
vulnerabilities remain.  TFAH is calling for an increased sustained, ongoing
commitment to modernizing public health preparedness -- including the
continuing and extension of the federal, state, and local bioterrorism funds
and programs -- to better protect the health and safety of all Americans. 
3C H A P T E R
Congress should move to limit bioterrorism-
related liability concerns.  Liability protec-
tion and additional incentives are needed to
encourage private industry to invest in cru-
cial research and development for vaccines
and to provide protection for both public
health and private health care workers who
could be putting themselves in harm’s way
or exposing themselves to disease.
The IOM has called for “regulatory harmo-
nization” as essential for re-engaging pro-
duction and development of vaccines, which
is currently not a profitable endeavor for
most pharmaceutical companies.  TFAH
48
 Improving Community Participation in
Preparedness and the Public’s Right to Know.
As part of these measurable standards, infor-
mation about the states’ readiness should be
shared with the public in order for commu-
nities to understand preparedness programs
and plans, to know how their tax dollars are
being spent, and to ultimately hold their pub-
lic officials accountable.  
Policies need to be carefully developed to
ensure as much transparency as possible, yet
balance the public’s right to know with the
need to protect classified information and
keep it out of the hands of potential terrorists.
Currently, information about basic public
health programs, such as flu emergency plans
or communications readiness capabilities, are
not being shared with the public because secu-
rity implications have been taken to the
extreme.  These actions actually put the public
at increased risk by keeping them uninformed
and ill-prepared in the event of emergencies.
2.  PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT:  CONDUCT MORE DRILLS ON A 
ROUTINE BASIS TO ASSESS CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.
3.  LIMIT LIABILITY TO ENCOURAGE VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND
PROTECT HEALTH CARE WORKERS
Most public health and emergency response
experts agree that practice exercises are the
best way to assess and increase preparedness.
In fact, early draft versions of CDC prepared-
ness standards, final versions of which were
expected to be released in 2004 but are still
unavailable, call for drills based on hypothet-
ical attacks or outbreaks as the optimal form
of measuring readiness.  Drills must be devel-
oped and conducted with specific standards
in place to measure performance and abili-
ties and ensure that public health is integrat-
ed into emergency management systems.
Practice scenarios are needed to:
 Allow states and localities to understand the
application of their quarantine and isolation
laws.  Learning how to apply these laws
should include practicing the best ways to
communicate with the public during differ-
ent types of scenarios to minimize exposure
to threats, spread of disease, and unnecessary
fear and anxiety.  Often complex, these laws
can be hard to implement, particularly across
jurisdictions.  Experts often cite these laws as
a major flaw in preparedness planning. 
 Improve coordination and communica-
tion between the public and private sec-
tors, especially public and private health
care workers.  Preparation is key; under-
standing roles and capabilities before an
emergency strikes is crucial.  There is also
a great need to improve advanced plan-
ning and involvement by other sectors,
ranging from schools to local businesses.
 Learn how to prioritize “at-risk” popula-
tions and deliver services to them while
also managing the needs and expecta-
tions of the rest of the community.
Drills can also include “all-hazards” situa-
tions that help improve the health of the
community.  
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calls for the immediate creation of a bi-par-
tisan panel of experts to explore the com-
plications of vaccine policy and to help rein-
vigorate vaccine research, development,
and delivery in the U.S.  Some measures
that must be considered include:
 Providing liability protection and expedit-
ed or temporary approvals for antidotes
and vaccines related to potential emer-
gency threats.  For instance, the “investi-
gate” trial status of the smallpox vaccine
was a serious factor in the reluctance or
refusal of a large number of health care
workers to be immunized. 
 Breaking the “double-bind” for vaccine
manufacturers under current Securities
and Exchange Commission require-
ments.  Companies cannot count pro-
duced vaccines as assets until they are
used, which works against the need to cre-
ate stockpile inventory of vaccines and
antidotes for emergency uses.
 Creating financial stability in the vaccine
market to ensure the stockpile is ready for
emergencies.
Health professionals, particularly those in
first responder and direct care positions,
expose themselves to risk in the event of a
crisis.  They are put in a position where they
must wonder about the repercussions to
their own health and possible implications
for their families.  Liability protection and
adequate workers’ compensation issues
must be factored into emergency planning.  
4.  GET BACK TO BASICS:  FOCUS ON FIXING THE FUNDAMENTALS
AND AVOID BIO-DISTRACTIONS 
The good news in public health is that
experts know what works: 
 Investigative capabilities to assess the
health of communities -- people, air, water,
and food -- by having enough trained sci-
entists and health experts equipped with
the tools they need, including health
tracking, communications systems, and
laboratory capacity; and
 Containment, treatment, and interven-
tion capabilities to stop the spread of dis-
ease and other health threats through the
development and administration of vacci-
nations or isolating and caring for infec-
tious patients.   
The bad news is that the basics of public health
are currently not adequate to protect the pub-
lic from the range of health threats.  Since all
of the basic protections are essential, this has
resulted in a situation of relevant priorities
competing for limited resources and attention.
Complicating this problem are the recent
shifts in priority-setting and targets for funding,
which have resulted in new or untested pro-
grams distracting funding and attention from
persistent and fundamental weaknesses. 
TFAH recommends taking a “back to basics”
approach, which involves providing a clear,
coherent, consistent strategy that addresses
the core requirements for preparedness.  A
national summit, attended by experts in pub-
lic health, representatives of the health care
industry, and other impacted sectors, should
be convened to ensure this strategy is imple-
mented in a way that makes the best use of
limited public health dollars and that address-
es both emergency and ongoing challenges.
The following public health basics must be
addressed to achieve better preparedness:
 Bolstering the Workforce.  The new
Congress should consider reintroduction
and passage of the Public Health
Preparedness Workforce Act of 2004,
originally sponsored by Senators Chuck
Hagel (R-Neb.) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.).
The future of public health is contingent
on recruiting a new generation of work-
ers. Minimum staffing thresholds for
states and communities must be set and
met, such as the CDC recommendation
that there be one epidemiologist for
every 500,000 people.
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 Real Nationwide Health Tracking.  For a
decade, there have been fits and starts
toward developing a system to track the
public’s health to identify the causes of
diseases, understand disease patterns,
and learn how to prevent them.  It is time
to make a genuine investment in a state-
of-the-art health tracking network that is
compatible among states and ensures
individual privacy, but allows for the true
evaluation of the nation’s health by serv-
ing as a warning system for the emer-
gence of new problems and diseases.  This
should be linked to the tracking of the
nation’s food, water, and air supplies.
Recent attempts at new types of surveil-
lance systems are simply a distraction
from building a genuine, comprehensive
tracking system since they do not build
upon the existing infrastructure or
toward a comprehensive, integrated sys-
tem.  At a bare minimum, all states should
be expected to be compliant with the
CDC’s National Electronic Surveillance
System (NEDSS) by the end of 2005.
 Improving Stockpile Development,
Distribution and Administration Systems.
With only six states at verified “green” status
to distribute and administer vaccines and
antidotes in a crisis, most of the nation would
be left scrambling in the event of a major out-
break or emergency.  A prioritized national
goal should be required for all states to
achieve green status within two years.
 Modernizing Laboratory Capabilities.  All
states should be required to achieve suffi-
cient bio-response capabilities within two
years and 10 additional states should be
required to achieve chemical-response
capabilities by the end of 2005.  This will
require bolstering capacity of these labs
with the necessary technological advances.
 Strengthening Planning and Coordination.
With health officers’ time and resources
stretched thin, planning has not received
adequate attention, and local, state, and fed-
eral officials have often been at odds over
available resources.  This has led to friction at
a time when we need to look for ways to lever-
age resources and to improve efficiency.   
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WHAT DOES PREPAREDNESS LOOK LIKE?  WHAT SHOULD 
AMERICANS EXPECT?
Numerous evaluations of the nation’s public health system, including those conducted by the
CDC, IOM, and GAO, have found serious deficiencies.123
A 2003 IOM study on the public health infrastructure found:
 “Vulnerable and outdated health information systems and technologies; 
 An inadequately trained public health workforce; 
 Antiquated laboratory capacity;
 A lack of real-time surveillance and epidemiological systems;
 Ineffective and fragmented communications networks; 
 Incomplete domestic preparedness and emergency response capabilities; and
 Communities without access to essential public health services.”124
This raises the question:  What are the components of a basic system capable of protecting a
community’s health?
24x7 Emergency Response Capabilities Must Include:
 Rapid detection of a bioterror act or other emerging disease threats; 
 Intensive investigative capabilities to quickly determine the bio- or chemical agent used in
an attack or to diagnose a new disease;
 Mass containment and treatment strategies, including plans, surge workforce and equip-
ment, and pharmaceuticals needed for wide-scale vaccination or antidote administra-
tion and isolation and quarantine when necessary;
 Streamlined and clear communications channels so that health workers can communicate
with each other and be able to accurately and swiftly inform members of the public about
1) the nature of an attack or emergency; 2) their risk of exposure and how to seek treat-
ment when needed; 3) any actions that they or their families need to take.
What It Will Take to Achieve Adequate Preparedness:
 Leadership, Planning, and Coordination:  An established chain-of-command and well-
defined roles and responsibilities for seamless operations between different medical and
scientific functions during crisis situations.
 Expert and Comprehensive Workforce:  Highly trained and full staffs of experts, scientists
and other public health professionals.
 Modernized Technology:  State-of-the-art laboratory equipment and information collec-
tion and health tracking systems.
 Pre-Planned, Safety-First Rapid Emergency Response Capabilities and Precautions:
Tested plans and safety precautions to mitigate potential harm to communities and public
health professionals and first responders.
 Immediate, Streamlined Communications Capabilities:  Coordinated, integrated com-
munication among all parts of the public health system and with the public.
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Agroterrorism
Agroterrorism is defined as the “deliberate
introduction of an animal or plant disease
with the goal of generating fear, causing eco-
nomic losses, and/or undermining stability.”126
Experts say that “Agroterrorism not only
affects the animal or plant food chain that it
attacks but the public confidence in the prod-
uct as well. It has a psychological impact on
the public’s trust in government to provide
adequate quality control over foodstuffs. And
ultimately it could affect the trade of agricul-
tural products with the rest of the world.”127
Foodborne Diseases
Of the over 75 million reported cases of
foodborne diseases that occur each year in
the U.S., most are relatively mild and pass
within a few days.  However, a minimum of
325,000 hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths
are caused by foodborne diseases each year,
although the number of cases are believed
to be much higher since some cases are not
counted due to poor tracking capabilities.128
The Foodborne Disease Active Surveillance
Network (FoodNet) is a system that relies on
collaboration among the CDC, the FDA,
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA).129 FoodNet relies on more fre-
quent collection of incidence data to more
quickly and accurately detect trends and
outbreak statistics.  Currently, FoodNet
operates in only nine states.130
In recent years, experts have cited the
nation’s food supply as a potential target for
terrorists.  In a news conference announcing
his resignation as Secretary of HHS in early
December 2004, Tommy Thompson said,
“for the life of me, I cannot understand why
the terrorists have not attacked our food sup-
ply, because it is so easy to do.”131 The con-
cern is not far-fetched; in 2000, a restaurant
employee in China killed 40 people by delib-
erately poisoning customers’ food.132
Experts have warned that a bioterrorist
attack targeting food could be particularly
devastating as our nation’s production sys-
tem becomes increasingly centralized.133  
The CDC classifies potential bioterrorist
agents into three categories of severity.134
Anthrax and botulism are viewed as the most
devastating potential agents in a foodborne
attack and are classified as “Category A”
agents.135 (They are also inhalation threats as
well as foodborne threats).  Anthrax is caused
by a spore-forming bacterium that enters the
body through inhalation, a cut or abrasion on
the skin, or eating infected meat.136 Anthrax’s
viability as a biological weapon is clear - - mail-
ings sent to government figures during the
Appendix A:
BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 
NUCLEAR THREATS
Range of Biological Threats
“THE BIO-THREAT IS PARTICULARLY WORRISOME BECAUSE WE KNOW SO LITTLE ABOUT
TERRORIST CAPABILITIES.  WE DON’T KNOW NEARLY AS MUCH AS WE WOULD LIKE ABOUT
THEIR MOTIVATIONS AND THEIR INTENTIONS TO EMPLOY BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.  YET WE
ALSO KNOW THAT A BIO-ATTACK COULD RESULT IN A CATASTROPHIC LOSS OF LIFE.” 
-- U.S. REP. CHRISTOPHER COX (R-CALIF.), CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY DURING A JUNE 2004 HEARING125
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fall of 2001 contained anthrax spores, sicken-
ing and killing several mail-handlers in the
Washington, D.C., area.  Botulism is a bacter-
ial disease that paralyzes muscles, causing the
individual to stop breathing.137 Botulism is a
major bioterrorism threat because of its
“extreme potency and lethality; its ease of pro-
duction, transport and misuse; and the poten-
tial need for prolonged intensive care in
affected persons. Botulinum toxin is the sin-
gle most poisonous substance known.”138  
“Category B” agents include the more com-
monly occurring salmonella and E. coli bac-
teria.  Salmonella’s potential as a weapon of
terror was illustrated by the purposeful con-
tamination of a salad bar in The Dalles,
Ore., in 1984, when 750 individuals were
sickened by cult members hoping to seize
control of the county’s elections.139
Vector-borne and Zoonotic
(Animal-borne) Diseases
A vector is an organism that carries disease.
The spread of illnesses such as Lyme dis-
ease, dengue fever, West Nile virus, yellow
fever, certain encephalitides, and plague are
contingent upon vectors.  The CDC’s
Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases
oversees federal surveillance and control
efforts related to these diseases.140
Animal-borne (also called zoonotic) diseases
are a sub-category of vector-borne diseases,
consisting of diseases spread by animals.
Recent headline-grabbing diseases such as
SARS, mad cow disease, and West Nile virus
are all classified as zoonotic diseases.
Waterborne Terrorism
Deliberate contamination of the nation’s
water supply is of critical concern to home-
land security officials.  During 2001-2002,
the CDC estimates that 1,020 persons con-
tracted illnesses from drinking water and
2,536 persons contracted illnesses from
recreational water disease outbreaks.141 A
purposeful contamination could affect a
much larger population.
In recognition of the dangers of a terror
attack targeting the water supply, the
American College of Preventive Medicine
convened a June 2003 conference to discuss
control, detection, and response strate-
gies.142 The conference focused particularly
on the role of local physicians and medical
officials in diagnosing cases of contamina-
tion and rapidly spreading information.  
A Web site designed to assist local medical
communities’ water terrorism preparedness
can be found at www.waterhealthconnec-
tion.org.
The CDC “has identified over 60 toxic sub-
stances that could be used as chemical weapon
by terrorists.”143 And the EPA reports that “123
chemical facilities located throughout the
country have toxic ‘worst case’ scenarios
where more than a million people in the sur-
rounding area could be at risk of exposure to
a cloud of toxic gas if a release occurred.”144 
On Feb. 12, 2003, the DHS warned that “Al
Qa’ida operatives also may attempt to
launch conventional attacks against the U.S.
nuclear/chemical-industrial infrastructure
to cause contamination, disruption, and ter-
ror. Based on information, nuclear power
plants and industrial chemical plants
remain viable targets.”145
Ricin
In early February 2004, ricin was detected in a
U.S. Senate mailroom serving the office of
Majority Leader Bill Frist, MD.  Though no ill-
nesses were reported in the mailroom or in
Sen. Frist’s office, death can result from as little
as one milligram of ricin exposure.146 Ricin, a
toxin extracted from waste products of the cas-
tor bean, prevents cells from acquiring neces-
sary proteins needed to function.  Individuals
poisoned with ricin are not contagious.147  
Chemical Threats
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A famous case of ricin poisoning which also
illustrates ricin’s potency occurred in 1978
when Bulgarian playwright Georgi Markov was
killed in London.  The assassin injected a small
ricin pellet from a specially modified umbrella
into Markov’s leg.  Markov, a Communist
defector, was dead within four days.148    
Sarin
Sarin is a synthetic chemical warfare “nerve”
agent originally developed in Germany in
1938.149 Sarin is clear, colorless, and odorless
and can evaporate into a vapor and spread
throughout the immediate area.  The agent
impacts the body by preventing the “operation
of the chemical that acts as the body’s ‘off
switch’ for glands and muscles. Without an ‘off
switch,’ the glands and muscles are constantly
being stimulated. They may tire and no longer
be able to sustain breathing function.”150
The most notable terrorist usage of sarin
occurred on March 20, 1995, when mem-
bers of a Japanese cult released the agent in
the Tokyo subway system, killing 12 and
injuring nearly 4,000.151 Japanese law
enforcement officials charged members of
the Aum Shinrikyo cult with the attacks,
which were simultaneously carried out at
five points on the subway system.  
The subway attacks followed the group’s earli-
er sarin attack in June 1994, which killed seven
and injured 500 residents of an apartment and
dormitory cluster in Matsumoto, Japan.152 The
cult, which is accused of trying to overthrow
the Japanese government through the attacks,
also experimented with biological terrorist
agents such as ebola, anthrax, and botulin, in
addition to other forms of chemical attacks.153 
2002 Terrorist Attack at a Moscow
Theater: A Chemical Response
On October 23, 2002, in the middle of an
evening performance at a Moscow theater,
Chechen rebels equipped with firearms and
explosives took 800 patrons hostage.  The
militants threatened to kill all the hostages
unless Russia granted independence to
Chechnya.  Over the next few days, negotia-
tions with Russian authorities stalled, and
the rebels declared that they would execute
each hostage, one by one.  
Just before dawn on October 26, Russian
forces pumped an incapacitating gas into the
theater.  Every rebel was killed, and the major-
ity of the theater patrons were freed.
However, the gas caused many casualties
among the hostages; 117 died from the effects
and many more had serious reactions.154  
It was later disclosed that the gas was a
chemical compound that included the anes-
thetic fentanyl.  However, at the time of the
incident, poor communication with medical
personnel led to confusion about what
chemical was used and the proper course of
treatment.  U.S. Ambassador to Russia
Alexander Vershbow said:
“We regret that the lack of information sim-
ply contributed to the confusion after the
immediate operation to free the hostages
was over.  It’s clear that perhaps with a little
more information at least a few more of the
hostages would have survived.”155
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Counterterrorism strategists have long dis-
cussed the dangers of a possible terrorist
attack involving radioactive material.  The
scattering of radioactive materials by using
explosives (“dirty bomb”), the destruction
of a nuclear facility, the introduction of
radioactive material into a food or water
supply, and the explosion of a nuclear
device near a population center are all
potential radiological disasters.156 Radiation
fallout from a radiological emergency can
cause both immediate injury and a long-
term rise in cancer prevalence.157
The Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan (FRERP) unites several feder-
al agencies under a response plan to a poten-
tial nuclear disaster or attack.  In the advent
of an emergency, a lead federal agency would
be tasked with response and control at the
site of the danger.  The affected state would
have responsibility beyond the accident site,
with other federal agencies assisting.158
A recent study conducted by the EPA, Johns
Hopkins University’s Bloomberg School of
Public Health, and the Public Health
Foundation evaluated the status of radiation
information services available for public
health agencies as well as the agencies’ abil-
ities to answer a range of radiation-related
questions from the public.  The findings dis-
covered a lack of protocols to ensure consis-
tent information and the need for strength-
ened collaborations with the media and first
responders -- critical information providers
during a time of emergency.  The study also
recommended “a more readily accessible,
robust, science-based and balanced infor-
mation source that state, local and tribal
health officials can utilize to meet commu-
nities’ needs.”159   
Radiological Threats
Although civilian biodefense spending is
largely managed through HHS, DHS also
plays an obvious role in coordinating and
designing the nation’s response to a range
of terrorist threats.160 Responding and
preparing to the range of biological, chemi-
cal, and radiological threats requires the
input, expertise, and expenditure of other
agencies.  Responsibility for food, agricul-
ture, and water safety initiatives are largely
delegated to USDA and EPA.
 Foodborne and Agriculture
Defense
The USDA is the lead agency responsible
for defense of the nation’s food and agri-
culture supply.  Due to a new “Food and
Agriculture Defense Initiative,” the
USDA will receive a dramatic increase in
biodefense funding in FY05.  Its food
defense budget has risen from $10 mil-
lion in FY 2003 to $14 million in FY 2004
to $5 million in the FY 2005 budget.161  
The agricultural defense budget has also
received a dramatic boost, largely due to
a new laboratory at the BSL-3 level in
Ames, Iowa, to diagnose animal dis-
eases.162 USDA agricultural defense dol-
lars have ranged from $194 million in FY
2003 to $64 million in FY 2004 to an esti-
mated $247 million in FY 2005.163
 Waterborne Terrorism
The EPA has “spent about $42 million on
water safety critical infrastructure protec-
tion in FY 2003 and 2004.  In FY 2005, fund-
ing for this program was cut to zero.  The
EPA dispensed nearly $15 million in water
safety grants to states from FY 2003-2005.164   
Agency Responsibilities: Moving Beyond DHS 
and HHS
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Appendix B:
FEDERAL BIOTERRORISM FUNDING BY SOURCE AND YEAR
FY 2003 FY 2004
% Change 
State CDC HRSA Total State CDC HRSA Total FY 03 - FY 04
Alabama $14,056,645 $7,762,315 $21,818,960 Alabama $12,910,651 $7,762,315 $20,672,966 -5%
Alaska $6,284,107 $1,958,803 $8,242,910 Alaska $5,205,459 $1,958,803 $7,164,262 -13%
Arizona $15,755,035 $9,030,450 $24,785,485 Arizona $16,470,314 $9,030,450 $25,500,764 3%
Arkansas $10,461,043 $5,077,591 $15,538,634 Arkansas $9,339,265 $5,077,591 $14,416,856 -7%
California $55,589,662 $38,773,726 $94,363,388 California $59,319,441 $38,773,727 $98,093,168 4%
Colorado $13,979,790 $7,704,930 $21,684,720 Colorado $13,654,314 $7,704,930 $21,359,244 -2%
Connecticut $11,960,524 $6,197,207 $18,157,731 Connecticut $10,828,647 $6,197,207 $17,025,854 -6%
Delaware $6,614,378 $2,205,406 $8,819,784 Delaware $5,518,506 $2,205,406 $7,723,912 -12%
D.C. $11,162,901 $2,868,302 $14,031,203 D.C. $11,985,069 $2,868,302 $14,853,371 6%
Florida $38,181,999 $25,775,967 $63,957,966 Florida $37,583,527 $25,775,967 $63,359,494 -1%
Georgia $22,034,847 $13,719,390 $35,754,237 Georgia $21,575,121 $13,719,390 $35,294,511 -1%
Hawaii $7,486,672 $2,856,721 $10,343,393 Hawaii $6,384,925 $2,856,721 $9,241,646 -11%
Idaho $7,676,282 $2,998,297 $10,674,579 Idaho $6,588,258 $2,998,297 $9,586,555 -10%
Illinois $24,923,148 $15,875,995 $40,799,143 Illinois $23,718,971 $15,875,995 $39,594,966 -3%
Indiana $17,416,386 $10,270,929 $27,687,315 Indiana $16,262,765 $10,270,929 $26,533,694 -4%
Iowa $10,941,890 $5,436,624 $16,378,514 Iowa $9,816,873 $5,436,624 $15,253,497 -7%
Kansas $10,476,095 $5,088,830 $15,564,925 Kansas $9,354,215 $5,088,830 $14,443,045 -7%
Kentucky $13,245,815 $7,156,894 $20,402,709 Kentucky $12,105,282 $7,156,894 $19,262,176 -6%
Louisiana $14,059,595 $7,764,518 $21,824,113 Louisiana $12,913,581 $7,764,518 $20,678,099 -5%
Maine $7,603,092 $2,943,648 $10,546,740 Maine $6,600,682 $2,943,648 $9,544,330 -10%
Maryland $15,915,365 $9,150,163 $25,065,528 Maryland $14,756,853 $9,150,163 $23,907,016 -5%
Massachusetts $17,972,524 $10,686,180 $28,658,704 Massachusetts $17,640,158 $10,686,180 $28,326,338 -1%
Michigan $25,278,581 $16,141,386 $41,419,967 Michigan $26,896,854 $16,141,386 $43,038,240 4%
Minnesota $15,101,600 $8,542,551 $23,644,151 Minnesota $14,701,780 $8,542,551 $23,244,331 -2%
Mississippi $10,795,501 $5,327,321 $16,122,822 Mississippi $9,671,470 $5,327,321 $14,998,791 -7%
Missouri $16,424,504 $9,530,322 $25,954,826 Missouri $15,952,563 $9,530,322 $25,482,885 -2%
Montana $6,834,837 $2,370,015 $9,204,852 Montana $5,775,627 $2,370,015 $8,145,642 -12%
Nebraska $8,485,811 $3,602,747 $12,088,558 Nebraska $7,377,335 $3,602,747 $10,980,082 -9%
Nevada $9,251,219 $4,174,253 $13,425,472 Nevada $8,927,588 $4,174,253 $13,101,841 -2%
New Hampshire $7,552,202 $2,905,650 $10,457,852 New Hampshire $6,465,014 $2,905,650 $9,370,664 -10%
New Jersey $22,248,528 $13,878,940 $36,127,468 New Jersey $21,047,364 $13,878,940 $34,926,304 -3%
New Mexico $8,710,551 $3,770,553 $12,481,104 New Mexico $8,803,295 $3,770,553 $12,573,848 1%
New York $27,794,404 $18,019,873 $45,814,277 New York $28,493,781 $18,019,873 $46,513,654 2%
North Carolina $21,630,396 $13,417,400 $35,047,796 North Carolina $20,433,395 $13,417,400 $33,850,795 -3%
North Dakota $6,290,025 $1,963,221 $8,253,246 North Dakota $5,223,458 $1,963,221 $7,186,679 -13%
Ohio $28,082,405 $18,234,914 $46,317,319 Ohio $27,626,951 $18,234,914 $45,861,865 -1%
Oklahoma $12,031,404 $6,250,131 $18,281,535 Oklahoma $10,899,049 $6,250,131 $17,149,180 -6%
Oregon $12,039,235 $6,255,978 $18,295,213 Oregon $10,906,827 $6,255,978 $17,162,805 -6%
Pennsylvania $29,933,326 $19,616,940 $49,550,266 Pennsylvania $30,735,407 $19,616,940 $50,352,347 2%
Rhode Island $7,147,493 $2,603,466 $9,750,959 Rhode Island $6,048,030 $2,603,466 $8,651,496 -11%
South Carolina $13,232,255 $7,146,769 $20,379,024 South Carolina $12,091,813 $7,146,769 $19,238,582 -6%
South Dakota $6,536,811 $2,147,489 $8,684,300 South Dakota $5,441,461 $2,147,489 $7,588,950 -13%
Tennessee $16,651,663 $9,699,934 $26,351,597 Tennessee $15,488,192 $9,699,934 $25,188,126 -4%
Texas $48,310,184 $33,338,368 $81,648,552 Texas $51,803,533 $33,338,368 $85,141,901 4%
Utah $9,618,011 $4,448,125 $14,066,136 Utah $8,501,910 $4,448,125 $12,950,035 -8%
Vermont $6,242,254 $1,927,552 $8,169,806 Vermont $5,198,685 $1,927,552 $7,126,237 -13%
Virginia $19,584,849 $11,890,053 $31,474,902 Virginia $19,924,893 $11,890,053 $31,814,946 1%
Washington $17,146,134 $10,069,141 $27,215,275 Washington $16,978,969 $10,069,141 $27,048,110 -1%
West Virginia $8,649,835 $3,725,218 $12,375,053 West Virginia $7,540,254 $3,725,218 $11,265,472 -9%
Wisconsin $15,955,629 $9,180,227 $25,135,856 Wisconsin $14,811,846 $9,180,227 $23,992,073 -5%
Wyoming $6,000,636 $1,747,144 $7,747,780 Wyoming $4,908,897 $1,747,144 $6,656,041 -14%
CDC Total HRSA Total Grand Total  CDC Total HRSA Total Grand Total   % Change
FY 03 FY 03 FY 03 FY 04 FY 04 FY 04 FY 03 - FY 04
$870,000,000 $498,000,000 $1,368,000,000 $849,596,000 $498,000,000 $1,347,596,000 -1%
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The sources for the indicators come from a
variety of publicly available sources.  The
data were therefore collected at different
times and using different methodologies
and standards.  The indicators are intended
to serve as a composite snapshot rather than
as a uniform evaluative study.
INDICATOR 1:  STATE EXPENDITURES OF
FEDERAL BIOTERRORISM FUNDS165
“In early November 2004, the Association of
State and Territorial Health Officials
(ASTHO) surveyed the nation’s state and
territorial public health agencies to obtain
information regarding the extent to which
their CDC and HRSA preparedness cooper-
ative agreement funds for FY 2003 had been
“spent;” were contractually “obligated;” or
remained “unspent,” with an assumption
that requests would be submitted to carry-
over unspent funds for use in FY 2004.  The
date chosen for analysis was Aug. 31, 2004,
the last day of the official project year for
these cooperative agreements.”166   
“While these data represent the best cur-
rently available fiscal estimates as to the
states’ use of public health preparedness
funds, months from now, when final audited
numbers become available, there will be dif-
ference between this data set and those
numbers.  Hopefully at the national level
these variances will not be major.  These fig-
ures do represent the most comprehensive
review of fiscal data available at this time.
Unlike in reporting of the fiscal status of FY
2002 funds, in the FY 2003 figures where
possible states have made account for carry-
over from the prior project year.”167
INDICATOR 2:  STATE PUBLIC HEALTH
BUDGETS
TFAH conducted an analysis of state spend-
ing on public health programs for two of the
50 states’ recent budget cycles, fiscal years
2003 and 2004. The analysis is based on a
review of state public health budgets con-
ducted by the Health Policy Tracking
Service (HPTS) at Netscan iPublishing, Inc.,
formerly of the National Conference of
State Legislatures (NCSL), in conjunction
with TFAH from August to November 2004.
Appropriations for public health programs
and for the agency, department, or division
in charge of public health services were con-
sidered for state fiscal years 2003 to 2004.
States were asked to provide HPTS with state
budgets -exclusive of federal funds- during
the states’ FY 2003 and 2004 budget cycles
for major public health programs.  These
programs included:  infectious disease con-
trol and epidemiology; laboratories; cancer
and other chronic diseases, maternal and
child health, immunization; Tuberculosis;
HIV/AIDS and other STDs; restaurant
inspections; and food safety and testing.  If
the data indicated an increase in state budg-
ets from FY 2003 and FY 2004, states received
a point.  If the data indicated a decrease,
HPTS and TFAH researched publicly avail-
able budget and appropriations information
for the department, agency or division in
charge of public health.  The purpose was to
verify the decrease was accurate and not the
result of a budget issue such as a transfer of
funds to another budget account, or a reor-
ganization or restructure of the department
responsible for public health.  This review
was conducted by searching budget docu-
ments on state websites, and attempting to
contact states to verify findings.
TFAH used the state-reported budget data
to construct representative state budgets for
public health.  This approach excluded
health care dollars such as Medicaid funds,
State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP) funds, and pharmaceutical assis-
tance programs because these programs are
traditionally viewed as separate from public
Appendix C:
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health programs.  The approach also
helped to exclude federal dollars which
many states provide publicly, bundled with
state funding.  In addition, spending on
social services programs could also be
excluded using this approach.  
In several cases when TFAH used the public
health budget for the department, agency
or division in charge of public health, the
public health dollars were often bundled
with health care spending or social services
funding.  Other states report total budgets
that include significant federal dollars.  This
may have led to an overstatement of public
health funding in these states.  Several states
who received a point for this indicator may
not have actually increased their spending
on public health programs.
The goal of the analysis was not a precise
accounting of state public health spending
but to seek an indication of trends in state
level discretionary budgets for public
health.  Moreover, states do not have a uni-
form definition of public health, so compar-
isons across states is difficult to achieve.
In addition, there also was variation in the
fiscal years covered by the reports because
of different budget cycles.  While the major-
ity of states budgets are for FY 2003 and
2004, Montana’s budget figures, for exam-
ple, are from the state’s 2003 and 2005
budget biennium.  TFAH allocated the
change in state public health spending over
two budget cycles for Montana and the two
other states with biennial budget cycles,
Oregon and North Dakota.  
INDICATOR 8:  QUARANTINE ANALYSIS
Caveats to the Analysis
 An examination of state statutory quaran-
tine authority, while relevant, does not com-
pletely address whether public health
authorities have adequate quarantine pow-
ers.  Additional authorization to engage
quarantine powers maybe derived from state
administrative regulations, specific ordi-
nances at the local levels, or even case law.
 Enhanced, expedited quarantine
authority in some jurisdictions may be
dependent upon the declaration of a
state of emergency or public health
emergency.  The “emergency powers”
designation (*) in the indicator chart
attempts to classify those states where
some quarantine authority may be con-
tingent on such declaration(s).
 Whether a state allows quarantine via
statutes does not suggest that its health
authorities would or could use these powers
under the given facts.  Multiple other fac-
tors are important to consider, including:
 Whether (and what) procedures must
be followed to seek prior approval for
the action through administrative or
judicial tribunals;
 Whether the use of quarantine is fully
substantiated by the facts (e.g., how
credible is the information?; how sure
are public health authorities as to the
infectious nature of the agent?; could
all (or even most) persons in the hotel
have been exposed?); 
 Whether federal agents may utilize
their own limited quarantine powers;
and
 Whether other powers, such as a limit-
ed period of civil confinement during
a public  health investigation, may be
authorized or more appropriate to
address the identified threat to the
public’s health.
 Statutory authority to quarantine may not
fully delineate the laws and policies that dic-
tate how a public health authority imple-
ments a quarantine measure.  Thus, for exam-
ple, in the Center’s Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act, quarantine involves a bun-
dle of legal responsibilities that include pro-
viding due process and respecting individual
civil liberties.  Some states may statutorily
authorize the use of quarantine but fail to
specify the terms of its performance.
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The 10 indicators viewed collectively help
assess the states’ public health emergency
preparedness capabilities.  The indicators in
the 2003 and 2004 reports differed to reflect
changed expectations for levels of prepared-
ness, given the additional time and funding
that has been devoted toward improvements
efforts.  Therefore, direct comparisons of the
scores cannot be made.
Appendix D:
STATE-BY-STATE 2004 SCORES COMPARED TO 2003 SCORES
States 2004 Total / Score 2003 Score
Alabama 5 6
Alaska 3 3
Arizona 5 5
Arkansas 5 2
California 5 7
Colorado 6 5
Connecticut 6 4
Delaware 5 5
District of Columbia 4 3
Florida 9 7
Georgia 6 3
Hawaii 6 4
Idaho 6 3
Illinois 5 5
Indiana 4 4
Iowa 6 3
Kansas 7 3
Kentucky 7 2
Louisiana 6 5
Maine 6 3
Maryland 6 7
Massachusetts 3 5
Michigan 6 3
Minnesota 8 5
Mississippi 7 2
Missouri 7 4
Montana 7 3
Nebraska 8 6
Nevada 5 5
New Hampshire 8 5
New Jersey 5 5
New Mexico 5 2
New York 5 6
North Carolina 9 5
North Dakota 7 5
Ohio 6 4
Oklahoma 6 3
Oregon 6 3
Pennsylvania 4 3
Rhode Island 5 6
South Carolina 6 4
South Dakota 7 4
Tennessee 6 7
Texas 6 4
Utah 6 4
Vermont 7 3
Virginia 8 5
Washington 6 6
West Virginia 6 4
Wisconsin 6 2
Wyoming 4 4
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